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INTRODUCTION
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) t and Waters
v. Churchill2 are the United States Supreme Court's two most recent
encounters with the conflicts that arise when the Government seeks
to regulate the speech of its employees. Employees faced with this
prospect often interpose the First Amendment,3 either as a sword to
assert their rights to be able to engage in certain, future conduct
(e.g., NTEU),' or as a shield to protect against the Government
disciplining them after having engaged in such conduct (e.g.,
Waters) .5
NTEUand Waters highlight the tension that exists between a public
employee's First Amendment free speech rights and the public
employer's ability to limit those rights.6 NTEU involved two public
sector unions that challenged the constitutionality of a ban imposed
in the Ethics Reform Act of 19891 on federal employees accepting
honoraria for writing and speaking activities.' Waters involved an
employee at a non-federal public hospital in Illinois who sued after
1. 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995). Justice Stevens wrote for a five-member majority. Justice
O'Connor filed a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.
2. 114 S. CL 1878 (1994). Waters is a plurality decision. Justice O'Connor, author of the
plurality decision and joined by the ChiefJustice andJustices Souter and Ginsburg, issued the
Court's decision. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, concurred in the
judgment only, not the opinion. Justice Stevens dissented,joined by Justice Blackmun. Justice
Souter joined Justice O'Connor in her plurality opinion, but added an interesting separate
concurring opinion in which he argued, inter ali, that Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion
should be read as a majority opinion. Id. at 1893 (Stevens, J., concurring).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. See United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1020
(1995). Justice O'Connor characterized this as "ex anti prohibition of speech, involving the
Government's attempt to regulate employee speech before it occurs. Id.
5. In NTEU, Justice O'Connor characterized this as "ex post' punishment, meaning the
Government's attempt to sanction speech aflerit has occurred, which the Government considers
to have hampered its ability to operate efficiently. I& at 1020. "Ex post' punishment acts like
a deterrent. The Government hopes that by punishing such conduct, it will not recur, either
by the same employee or other employees emboldened by the first employee's actions.
6. For purposes of this Article, a federal employee is one who has been appointed to a
position in the U.S. Government. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (authorizing President to
appoint high-level civilian officials in government "with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,"
and in which "the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers... in
the President alone ... or in the Heads of Departments"). Congress has granted this
constitutional appointment authority to the President in 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) and 5 U.S.C. §§
1104, 3101 (1994), for most categories of federal employees. Appointment authorities are
scattered throughout the U.S. Code for various other types of federal appointees. These,
however, are beyond the scope of this Article.
7. Pub. L No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5318 (1994)). The statute
is a substantial revision to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat.
1824 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-709 (1994)).
8. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1010.
2234 THE AMERICAN UNmVRsnY LAW REVIEw [Vol. 44:2231
having been fired for engaging in what she believed to be protected
speech.9
This Article reviews both NTEU and Waters in the context of prior
decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the
principal court tasked with developing a uniform body of case law
governing federal employees."l  This necessarily involves also
reviewing decisions of the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB)," the principal administrative body tasked with adjudicating
federal employee appeals of agency personnel actions that fall within
its jurisdiction. 2 Employees who are disciplined with a penalty
sufficiently severe to trigger MSPBjurisdiction and who wish to appeal
the discipline, must first seek Board review, then may appeal to the
Federal Circuit.
Although neither Waters nor NTEU are Federal Circuit or MSPB
cases, 3 the Supreme Court's rulings and reasoning about the law
9. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1880 (1994).
10. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a creation of the Federal Court
Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164,96 Stat. 32 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994)).
The Federal Circuit was created to ensure uniformity of decisions in cases involving federal
employees. Prior to its creation, case law developed in each of the federal circuit courts of
appeal. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 387 (1983) (describing various avenues of appeal
available in the past for federal employees).
11. The U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) was created by the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95454, 92 Stat. 1121 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1222
(1994)). With the passage of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, the Federal Circuit
became the exclusive jurisdiction for appeals from final orders or final decisions of the MSPB.
Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127(a), 96 Stat. 25, 37-38 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (9) (1994) and
5 U.S.C. § 7703 (1994)).
12. 5 C.F.R. § 1200.1 (1995). The MSPB exercises both original and appellate jurisdiction.
It has originaljurisdiction over actions brought by the Special Counsel (allegations of prohibited
personnel practices, whistleblower reprisal, and Hatch Act violations) and certain actions
concerning members of the Senior Executive Service and Administrative LawJudges. 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.2 (1995). In addition, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3 (1995), the MSPB has appellate
jurisdiction that encompasses 21 separate personnel actions, a number of which are based on
express statutory provisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 4303 (1994) (covering reductions in grade or
removals for unacceptable performance); id. §§ 7512, 7513 (covering removal, reduction in
grade or pay, suspension for more than 14 days, or furlough for 30 days or less for cause that
will promote efficiency of government service); id §§ 7541-7543 (covering removal, or
suspension for more than 14 days, of career appointee in Senior Executive Service); i. § 3595
(covering reduction in force of career appointee in Senior Executive Service); id. § 5335(c)
(covering reconsideration decisions sustaining a denial of within-grade step increase in pay for
general schedule employees); id §§ 8347(d)(1)-(2), 8461(e)(1) (discussing authority and
administration of Office of Personnel Managementand appeals to MSPB); 5 U.S.C. § 3592(a) (3)
(1994) (covering removal of career appointee from Senior Executive Service for failure to be
recertified); 38 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1) (D) (1988) (covering certain terminations of employees
during probationary periods); Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 181(a) (2), 108 Stat. 382 (1994) (to be
codified at 22 U.S.C. § 4011) (covering reduction-in-force actions affecting career candidate
appointee in Foreign Service).
13. Neither NTEUnor Water could have arisen in the Federal Circuit given the context in
which they occurred. If Waters involved a federal employee that was fired, however, the MSPB
would have hadjurisdiction pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7512 (1994), which covers removal for cause
to promote efficiency of governmental service. See infra notes 32-42 (discussing NTEU and
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governing public employees in these cases also govern the Federal
Circuit and the MSPB. The Federal Circuit lacks jurisdiction to hear
cases, such as NTEU, which involve constitutional challenges to
statutes. The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over federal employee
cases is governed by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 19 8 2,"4
which limits the Federal Circuit to only those cases that can be
appealed from the MSPB. The MSPB, in turn, as an administrative
agency, is without jurisdictional authority to determine the constitu-
tionality of federal statutes, although it does have authority to
adjudicate a constitutional challenge to an agency's application of a
statute.
15
This Article first reviews the historical source of the Federal
Government's authority over its employees, and the change in "status"
that renders public employees more susceptible to government
authority than their private sector counterparts or than private
citizens. The Article next reviews what might seem to be anomalous
historical developments-a steady expansion of certain federal
employee workplace rights, at the same time as the Government
exercises its authority, as an employer, to impose limits on the ex ante
speech of its employees. The next section uses the plurality decision
in Waters as a basis for discussing what ex post sanctions the Govern-
ment can or cannot impose against its employees for workplace
conduct involving speech. The Article concludes with a review of
decisions issued by the Federal Circuit and the MSPB, placing these
decisions in the context of NTEU and Waters. Neither Waters nor
NTEU requires the MSPB or the Federal Circuit to reevaluate their
earlier decisions. Nonetheless, Waters will have an impact on the
judicial thought process of both the MSPB and the Federal Circuit
because it lays out an analytical framework for a trier of fact to use
when evaluating a disciplinary action against a public employee;
Water
14. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 37 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994)).
15. See Stephen v. Department of Air Force, 47 M.S.P.RL 672, 684 (1991) (holding that
MSPB can adjudicate constitutional matters related to agency application of statute); Bayly v.
Office of Personnel Management, 42 M.S.P.R. 524, 525 (1990) (allowing MSPB to adjudicate
constitutional challenges to agency's application of statute); May v. Office of Personnel
Management, 38 M.S.P.R. 534, 538 (1988) (stating that although MSPB is without authority to
determine constitutionality of statutes, MSPB has authority to adjudicate constitutional challenge
to agency's application of statute). Although the MSPB, and hence the Federal Circuit, cannot
consider a direct attack on the constitutionality of a statute, such as was involved in NTEU, both
adjudicatory bodies could consider the constitutionality of the statute when the agency attempts
to sanction an employee for violating such statute.
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NTEU, on the other hand, will have less of an impact because it
involves the underlying constitutionality of a statute. 16
NTEU has spawned a major decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, Sanjour v. Environmental Protection
Agency. 7 In an en banc decision using an NTEU analysis, the D.C.
Circuit has ruled the honorarium ban of the Ethics in Government
Act unconstitutional. 8  This decision is significant because it
addresses directly what the Court in NTEU did not. 9 In NTEU, the
conduct the Government sought to regulate was speaking or writing
off-duty on topics unrelated to the jobs of the federal employees.2"
In Sanjour, however, using NTEU as a springboard, the D.C. Circuit
confronted the issue of the government's ability to regulate the off-
duty speech of its employees on subjects directly related to their on-
duty positions.2"
When the Supreme Court reviews questions of public employment
law such as these, monumental constitutional principles that are
already in tension are brought into direct conflict, much like two
continental plates grinding against one another beneath the earth's
surface. This is not unlike the tension between coordinate branches
of government, most particularly when Congress and the Court clash
over major social issues, where the events that these collisions produce
may be cataclysmic.22 Earthquakes may be spawned in the form of
16. See infra notes 81-143 (discussing due process rights of federal employees and forums
to which federal employees have access to initiate complaints).
17. 56 F.Sd 85 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
18. Sanjour v. Environmental Protection Agency, 56 F.3d 85, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
19. See infra Part IIIA3 (discussing first application of NTE).
20. See infra Part IILA.2.
21. Sanjour, 56 F.3d at 96-97.
22. The essence of this constitutional continental drift is the Tenth Amendment. It
establishes the interrelationship between the rights granted by the citizens to the federal
sovereign, those reserved to the states, and those reserved to the people. To draw an analogy,
one could look upon each of these as continental plates. The events which are the subject of
this Article are those in which the sovereign, exercising rights granted to it under the
constitution, collide with the reserved rights of citizens (as enumerated in the Bill of Rights)
when the sovereign is acting in its capacity as an employer and the citizens have changed their
status with respect to the sovereign by becoming its employees. Thus, when the sovereign seeks
to regulate the conduct of its employees to engage in political activities or to accept honoraria
for speaking engagements, the authority of the sovereign to determine how best to govern is
thrown into direct conflict with First Amendment rights of its citizens, albeit employees. In
1989, the Supreme Court issued five monumental employment law decisions involving
discrimination. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-78 (1989) (narrowing
scope of claims that could be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to enforce private employment
contracts involving complaints of discrimination); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S.
900, 910-12 (1989) (strictly enforcing limitations period against complainants who alleged
discriminatory impact under seniority systems adopted while they were employees); Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (holding that white fire fighters were not bound by consent
decree in discrimination case in which they were not parties); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 658-61 (1989) (shifting burden to plaintiffs in disparate impact cases to show that
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legislation.2' Aftershocks may occur in the form of more litiga-
tion.24 The most recent volcanic eruption of significant note
involved the air traffic controllers' strike in 1981Y It is significant
because the judicial review of the fallout from the strike fell almost
exclusively to the Federal Circuit via appeals from MSPB decisions by
employees on adverse personnel actions, many of which involved free
speech.26
At least one threshold observation is appropriate. In the last twenty
years, the development of federal employment law has shifted from
relative dormancy to a period of relatively vigorous seismic activity.
The relatively dormant period occurred during the first half of the
twentieth century between the 1912 passage of the Lloyd-LaFollette
Act2 and the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,28
each challenged practice contained disparate impact); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 251-52 (1989) (permitting employer to escape liability in adverse employment action
discrimination case if employer could show by preponderance of evidence that nondiscriminato-
ry motives would have resulted in adverse action).
23. In 1991, Congress responded to the Court's 1989 decisions, supra note 22, by enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(a) note, 52 U.S.C. § 2000(e) note (Supp. V 1993)), which legislatively overruled the five
1989 decisions. In this massive response, Congress also legislatively overruled two more Court
decisions. SeeEEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,251 (1991) (restricting extraterritori-
al effect of U.S. discrimination laws); West Virginia Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86 (1991)
(limiting recovery of expert witness fees as part of court costs or attorneys' fees in employment
discrimination lawsuits).
24. In addition to legislatively overruling these Court decisions, supra note 22, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) note, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) note (Supp. V 1993), created
important new substantive and procedural rights for employees, such as the right to compensa-
tory damages and the right to ajury trial in employment discrimination cases, which ultimately
lead to further litigation. For example, the Court reviewed the retroactivity of§ 101 and § 102,
which concerned the compensatory damage and jury trial provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1991. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510, 1517-18 (1994) (holding that § 101,
which concerns making and enforcing employment contracts, was not retroactive); Landgrafv.
USI Film Prods., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1488 (1994) (ruling that compensatory damage and jury
trial provisions of § 102 were not retroactive).
25. See infra notes 165-80 and 53748 and accompanying text (discussing litigation resulting
from 1981 air traffic controllers strike).
26. See Anderson v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 735 F.2d 537, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(explaining circumstances of Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike).
Federal employees are prohibited by law from striking. 5 U.S.C. § 7311(3) (1994).
Furthermore, it is a criminal offense for a federal employee to engage in a strike. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1918 (1994). More than 1200 controllers complied with a demand by President Reagan that
they return to work but approximately 11,500 continued to strike. President's Statement
Concerning Air Traffic Controllers' Strike, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 845 (Aug. 3, 1981).
The strikers were subsequently removed from federal service and many appealed. See
Schapansky v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 735 F.2d 477 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (analyzing appeal
of air traffic controller). While no Supreme Court decision led directly to the strike, a line of
historic Court precedents, defining the Government's authority when it acts in its capacity as an
employer, buttressed the statutory prohibitions against striking. See infra notes 151-80 and
accompanying text (discussing prohibitions against striking placed on federal employees).
27. Ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (1912) (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7102 (1994)).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
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followed by passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.29
Including the 1972 amendments, no fewer than eight major statutes
affecting rights of federal employees, 3° and a number of minor
statutes,"' have become law since the 1972 amendments to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Recent political events, highlighted by near
unanimous clamor of the legislative and executive branches for a
smaller federal workforce that works more efficiently, yet costs less,
indicate that the activity is not yet over. The increased legislative
activity, as well as landmark cases such as Waters and NTEU, highlight
the continuing importance of federal employment issues.
I. SOURCES OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY OVER ITS
CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES
A. The Concept of "Status"
In Waters, and to a lesser extent in NTEU, the Court anguished over
a subtle but fundamental delineation in the role of the federal
sovereign-when the Federal Government acts not solely as a
sovereign, but as both a sovereign and as an employer. It was this
intellectual struggle in Waters that caused Justice O'Connor, in her
plurality opinion, to ask rhetorically: "What is it about the
government's role as employer that gives it a freer hand in regulating
the speech of its employees than it has in regulating the speech of the
29. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7201 (1994).
30. These are the aforementioned 1972 amendments to the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, 5 U.S.C. § 7201 (1994); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)-(7) (1988); Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601, 1201-1224
(1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 note, 1981a, 1988, 2000e note (1988)); Whistleblower Protection Act
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201 note, 1206, 1211-1222
(1994)); Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-94, 107 Stat. 1001 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 3303, 5520a, 7321-7326 (1994)); Office of Special Counsel Reauthorization Act
of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-424, 108 Stat. 4361 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5509 note (1994)); Civil
Service Due Process Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461 (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§§ 7501 note, 7511, 7701 (1994)); Rehabilitation ActAmendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569,
106 Stat. 4344 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. V 1993)).
31. See Portability of Benefits for Nonappropriated Fund Employees Act of 1990, Pub. L
No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2101 note (1994)) (making it less onerous
for appropriated fund employees to be converted to nonappropriated fund status and vice versa
without losing benefits); Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (FEPCA), Pub. L No.
101-509, 104 Star. 1427 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5307 (1994)) (creating locality pay for
federal employees); Federal Employees Leave Sharing Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
103, 107 Stat. 1022 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 6301 note, 6373 (1994)) (authorizing federal
employees to donate annual leave either into leave bank or to particular employee who needs
it for medical reasons); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387 (1994); 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611-2619,2631-2636,2651-2654 (Supp.
V 1993)) (authorizing federal employees to take emergency medical leave for their immediate
family under 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387)).
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public at large?" 2 Noting that the Court has never directly answered
that question before, Justice O'Connor pointed to the "practical
realities of government employment"3 3 for the proposition that the
Government has much broader powers when it is acting as an
employer than when it is acting as a sovereign. Justice O'Connor
noted:
Rather, the extra power the government has in this area comes
from the nature of the government's mission as an employer....
The key to First Amendment analysis of government employment
decisions, then, is this: the government's interest in achieving its
goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a
relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a
significant one when it acts as employer. The government cannot
restrict the speech of the public at large in the name of efficiency.
But where the government is employing someone for the very
purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well
be appropriate.'
While the Court, prior to Waters, may have never directly answered
the question Justice O'Connor posed, it has addressed and answered
the question before in other contexts, such as engaging in partisan
politics. The rationale for the answer to Justice O'Connor's rhetorical
question lies in the historical distinction between the terms "appoint-
ee" and "employee." For federal employment purposes, "appointee"
is a constitutional term of art. It implies a change in "status" of the
person receiving a federal appointment. 5 That is, a change in the
status of the person vis4-vis the person's relationship with the Federal
Government (which becomes that person's employer) and the public
the federal employee now serves. We can trace Federal Government
authority over the civilians it employs to carry out the business of
government not only to specific provisions of the Constitution, 6 but
also to the Constitution's Preamble, which states that "in Order to...
insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
32. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1886 (1994).
33. Id (echoing concern addressed in majority opinion by Justice White 12 years earlier in
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)). Justice White addressed the balance that must be
struck between the primary aim of the First Amendment in "the full protection of speech upon
issues of public concern" and "the practical realities involved in the administration of a
government office." Id at 154.
34. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887-88.
35. See Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that federal workers
serve by appointment and hence, their rights are matter of legal status even where compacts are
made).
36. U.S. CONsr. art. H, § 2, cl. 2 (granting appointment powers to President and Congress).
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ourselves and our Posterity. "3 In essence "we," collectively as
citizens, gave over a certain amount of individual rights we otherwise
would possess when we agreed among ourselves to establish our
constitutional form of government.
In practical terms, it takes people employed by the Government to
insure the tranquility, provide the defense, promote the general
welfare, etc., for our government. This, then, is the nub of the issue:
can "we," collectively as citizens of our government, insist that those
who work for the Government accept a little less individual liberty in
return for ajob working for the Government? It seems so. For the
source of the Government's broader powers as an employer, however,
one must go back in time, even beyond the "social contract" we call
our constitution, to the social philosophers who inspired our nation's
founders.38 We, as citizens, relinquish a certain degree of individual
freedom for the benefit of having our particular form of government.
The Court has recognized this truism: "The powers granted by the
Constitution to the Federal Government are subtracted from the
totality of sovereignty originally in the states and the people." 9 The
citizen who becomes a federal employee, however, gives up even more
individual rights. As Justice O'Connor expressed in Waters, "When
someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency's
effective operations begins to do or say things that detract from the
agency's effective operation, then the government employer must
have some power to restrain her."4
37. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
38. See JOHN LOCKE, CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT, Second Essay 47 (Encyclopedia
Britannica Great Books ed. 1952) (1690). We, by the very act of consenting to be governed,
necessarily give up certain individual freedoms we otherwise could claim. As Locke expressed:
Men, being.., by nature all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of
his estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent,
which is done by agreeing with other men tojoin and unite into a community for their
comfortable, safe and peaceable living... And thus every man, by consenting with
others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an
obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority,
and to be concluded by it.
Id.
More than 70 years later, Rousseau further distilled the concept of the sovereign in the setting
of a social compact:
The act of association comprises a mutual undertaking between the public and the
individuals, and that each individual, in making a contract, as we may say, with himself,
is bound in a double capacity; as a member of the Sovereign he is bound to the
individuals, and as a member of the State, to the Sovereign.
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACr 392 (Encyclopedia Britannica Great Books ed.,
1952) (1792). Hence, the Constitution can be seen as an expression of the bargain thatwe have
struck with our sovereign, the Federal Government.
39. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947).
40. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887-88 (1994).
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As a threshold proposition, then, individuals give up certain rights
to live collectively in a governed society. Those individuals who
accept employment with the entity created to do the governing give
up even further rights. In doing so, they make themselves subject to
further controls by the entity created to govern the whole of the
citizenry-the 'sovereign. It is this second submission to authority
which effects a change in "status" between themselves and other
citizens. This is the concept of status.
B. "Appointment" as Effecting a Change in Status
Civil servants are required to make the Government function
properly. As the federal sovereign is not simply another "employer,"
so too is the federal employee not just another "employee." Becom-
ing a federal employee is a legal act. The act of making a private
citizen into a federal employee is the exercise of a power of govern-
ment rooted in the Constitution.41 The individual is not simply
"hired," but receives an "appointment"42 in the federal service and
is required to execute an oath of office.43 Having received a federal
appointment, the employee's "status," vis-a-vis the Federal Government
and vis-A-vis those who remain private citizens, changes.
The distinction between the contractual rights that may be created
in a private sector employer-employee relationship and the conse-
quence of an appointment in the federal service has long been
recognized. In 1850, the Supreme Court commented on the nature
of such an appointment
41. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 157 (1803) (discussing "constitutional
power of appointment"); see also Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 293 (1899) ("The
appointment to an official position ... even if it be simply a clerical [one], is not a mere
ministerial act, but one involving the exercise ofjudgment.").
42. For an explanation of the process and concept of appointment, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 2105(a),
3101, 3301 (1994). See also Bevans v. Office of Personnel Management, 900 F.2d 1558, 1562-64
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (explaining ramifications, effects, and processes of "appointment"); Watts v.
Office of Personnel Management, 814 F.2d 1576, 1579-82 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting impact and
outcomes of "appointment"); Homer v. Acosta, 803 F.2d 687, 691-93 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(elaborating on consequences and procedural elements of "appointment"). There are three
tests for determining when an individual has become a federal employee: (1) the individual
must be appointed by a government official with the authority to make an appointment; (2) the
individual must be engaged in the performance of a federal function, and (3) the individual
must be subject to the supervision of a federal official or employee. 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (1994).
All three tests must be met for an individual to be considered a federal employee. Baker v.
United States, 614 F.2d 263, 266 (Ct. Cl. 1980); see also United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402
(1976) (indicating that no individual is entitled to pay or benefits of government position until
he or she is duly appointed to it (citing United States v. McLean, 95 U.S. 750 (1878) and Ganse
v. United States, 376 F.2d 900, 902 (Ct. Cl. 1967))).
43. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3331, 3333 (1994).
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[T] he appointment to and the tenure of an office created for the
public use... do not come within the import of... vested, private
personal rights thereby intended to be protected. They are
functions appropriate to that class of powers and obligations by
which governments are enabled, and are called upon, to foster and
promote the general good ....4
This provides one possible answer to justice O'Connor's rhetorical
question in Waters. Employees who are appointed in the federal
service act as agents of the sovereign and thereby accept both the
powers and the obligations imposed on the sovereign itself. To
enable our government to function properly and to promote the
public good, federal employees must be under stricter authority of the
sovereign than private citizen. Harkening back to the words of
philosopher John Locke and his comments about the "body poli-
tic,"45 the Supreme Court commented in 1900:
[I]n every perfect or competent government, there must exist a
general power to enact and to repeal laws; and to create, and
change or discontinue, the agents designated for the execution of
those laws. Such a power is indispensable for the preservation of
the body politic and for the safety of the individuals of the commu-
nity.4
The "status" of the federal employee as an appointee, the critical
aspect that gives the Government greater authority over its employees
then over private citizens, has a recognized equivalent in another
category of individual in federal service-the soldier. The Court has
equated the change in "status" of a private citizen into a member of
the military as akin to the change in legal status that occurs when one
enters into a marriage.4 7 While unquestionably the Government
asserts much greater authority over a member of the military than a
civilian employee (the civilian can quit, the member of the military
cannot), the concept is the same. For example, a soldier who refuses
to do work cannot simply quit and return home, but remains subject
to military authority under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ).48 Thus, the military authorities can apprehend the soldier
and subject the soldier to confinement (a deprivation of liberty) until
44. Butler v. Pennsylvania Canal Comm'n, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402, 417 (1850).
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining that consenting to be governed
necessarily results in forfeiture of certain individual liberties).
46. Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 576 (1900).
47. See In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 151-53 (1890) (stating that enlistment constitutes
contract between soldier and government that involves, like marriage, change in status that
cannot be terminated at will).
48. 10 U.S.C. § 8 (1994).
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the soldier's case is adjudicated in accordance with the UCMJ. Or, if
a soldier refuses to go where assigned, military authorities may take
the soldier into custody and physically take the soldier where ordered
to go. In either circumstance, a civilian employee cannot be
subjected to such liberty deprivations. A soldier can be subjugated,
at least until the soldier's status as a soldier ends by discharge from
the military. The Court noted, however, that the source of the
authority over military officers is the same as the source of authority
the Government has over officers in the civil service.4 9 The term
"officers" in the civil service has been construed broadly. Thus, in
United States v. Hartwe, 5° a Treasury clerk in Boston responsible for
disbursements, was charged with misappropriating funds and was
indicted as an "officer" of the United States.5' As his defense, he
asserted that he was a mere clerk and not an "officer" within the
meaning of the law.52 The Court found that he was indeed a public
officer, occupying a public station conferred by "appointment" to a
position in the Government."
The distinction between private sector employees, governed in an
employment relationship flowing from contract law principles, versus
the appointment "status" of federal employees, has continued into
modem times. In 1975, the U.S. Court of Claims referred to the
Court's 1850 Butler v. Pennsylvania54 opinion, noting: "As early as
1850, the Supreme Court has held that public officers do not have
contracts of employment, but are appointed to office.... This
'appointment' status has been extended by law to employees of the
United States who are subject to laws administered by the Civil Service
Commission.",5 '
The significance of "status" as a critical factor in the federal
employment relationship was summarized in 1978 in the legislative
history of the Civil Service Reform Act:
49. See Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227, 232 (1880). The Court relied on two Attorney
General opinions. One was for the proposition that, with respect to official tenure, there is no
legal difference between officers in the Army and other officers of the Government. Military
Storekeepers, 60p. Att'y Gen. 4, 5-6 (1853). The other was for the proposition that the power
to remove officers in the military flows from the same authority to remove officers in the civil
service. The Claim of Surgeon Du Barry for Back Pay, 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 603, 611-12 (1847).
50. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385 (1867).
51. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 386-87 (1867).
52. Id.
53. 1& at 393.
54. 51 U.S. 10 (How.) 402 (1850).
55. Hopkins v. United States, 513 F.2d 1360, 1364 n.5 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (citing Butler for
proposition that rationale for appointee status centers on government need to maintain control
over agents who carry out public duties and terms under which they work).
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Public employees occupy a status entirely different from their
counterparts in the private sector. Public employees are the agents
of government, and in reality, exercise a part of the sovereignty
entrusted to government. While serving a mission different from
the private employee, the public employee enjoys benefits not
necessarily available to the private employee. Governments do not
go out of business.56
While the difference between "employees" in the private sector
sense and "appointees" in the public sector sense sometimes appears
overlooked, it is not forgotten. In 1983, both the D.C. Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit made it clear that "federal employees serve by appoint-
ment, not by contract."57 The Ninth Circuit noted that although the
distinction between an appointment in the federal service and a
contractual employment relationship in the private sector context
"may sound dissonant in a regime accustomed to the principle that
the employment relationship has its ultimate basis in contract, the
distinction nevertheless prevails in government service."" The D.C.
Circuit found that because federal employees serve by appointment
and their rights in their employment relationship with the sovereign
(as an employer) are thus a matter of legal status, the pay and
benefits of federal employees must be determined by federal statutes
and regulations rather than by reference to contract principles.5 9
Unfortunately, the concepts of "appointment" and "status" reside
in an esoteric realm that occasionally escapes the grasp of federal
courts who overlook them and end up issuing erroneous decisions.
For example, Spirides v. Reinhardt' involved a direct relationship
between an employee, Mrs. Spirides, and the Government. That is,
Mrs. Spirides was physically present in a government office, working
56. 124 CONG. REc. 29,200-02 (1978) (statement of Rep. Rousselot).
57. Riplinger v. United States, 695 F.2d 1163, 1164 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Kizas v. Webster,
707 F.2d 524, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that "federal workers serve by appointment" rather
than by private-sector notion of contract).
58. Riplinger, 695 F.2d at 1164.
59. Kizas, 707 F.2d at 535-37; see alsoArmy &Air Force Exch. Serv. v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728,
738-41 (1982) (finding that in employment by appointment, employment regulations and
statutes do not create implied-in-fact contract); Chu v. United States, 773 F.2d 1226, 1228-29
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that medical residency training is incident of employment by
appointment, not contract); Kania v. United States, 650 F.2d 264,268 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (noting that
it has long been held that rights of civilian and military public employees against government
do not turn on legal status even where compacts are made), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981);
Shaw v. United States, 640 F.2d 1254, 1260 (Ct. CL. 1981) (pointing out that public employment
does not give rise to contractual relationship in conventional sense); Bailey v. Marsh, 655 F.
Supp. 1250, 1254 (D. Colo. 1987) (stating that breach of contract claim fails to state claim
because federal employment relationship is governed by statute); Darden v. United States, 18
Cl. Ct. 855, 859 (1989) (stating that federal employees do not have contractual relationship with
Government).
60. 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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directly for a government official. To an outside observer, she
appeared to be just another government employee. But that was the
crux of the case. Was she really? The issue was whether Mrs.
Spirides, who read radio scripts in Greek for Voice of America, was an
employee of the government or an independent contractor. 1 Were
she found to be a government employee, she would be entitled to
claim the protections of Title VII-that is, file a discrimination
complaint against the Government as employer. But to be entitled to
"status" as an employee, and thus the protections of Title VII, she
must first to be shown to have met the technical requirements of 5
U.S.C. § 2105(a).62 The court in Spirides glossed over the require-
ments of 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a), and failed to address the importance of
whether or not Mrs. Spirides was an "appointee." Instead, the court
focused on whether an individual can be considered separately as an
employee for the remedial purposes of the federal discrimination laws
under Title VII.65 The question the court asked, in essence, was
whether an independent contractor working for the Government was
entitled to the protections of Title VII, which Congress enacted for
the benefit of federal employees? Could an independent contractor
be considered an "employee" for the purposes of Title VII only, but
not for other purposes? The court remanded the case to the district
court for a determination of whether or not the individual was an
employee versus an independent contractor under Title VII with a
broad judicial hint that perhaps the district court would be best to
consider her an employee for Tide VII purposes only.'
On remand, the district court displayed little patience for the
higher court's suggestion that an individual could be an employee for
Title VII purposes but not for other purposes. The district court had
no difficulty in determining that the individual, no matter what the
court of appeals thought about the matter, was not an employee for
Title VII purposes either.65
Comprehension of these subtleties and complexities also eludes
federal administrative oversight agencies. For example, as recently as
61. Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
62. XL at 828.
63. 1& at 830-32.
64. 1& at 832-34.
65. Spirides v. Reinhardt, 486 F. Supp. 685, 687 (D.D.C. 1980). The district court noted
tersely that, while it deferred to the rationale of the court of appeals, the indicia and the
evidence clearly showed that Mrs. Spirides was not an employee for Title VII purposes. 11/ She
received no sick leave, no annual leave, no retirement credits, no hospitalization, no salary
deductions for taxes, and no social security deductions (even as deductions were being made
from the pay of her husband, who was a government employee). Moreover, her husband's tax
return listed her occupation as "contractor." I. at 688.
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1993, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
in DaVeiga v. Department of Air Force,' relied on the Spirides decision
and overlooked the statutory requirements for appointing federal
employees. The EEOC focused erroneously on common law factors
governing whether an individual is an independent contractor or a
federal/public employee. In DaVeiga, the EEOC granted reconsidera-
tion of an appeal by the former employee of a company that had
contracted to operate several dining facilities on a military installa-
tion.67
The appellant alleged that she was fired from her job with the
contractor because of a complaint made against her by a government
employee. 6' The appellant had also filed a separate discrimination
complaint over her failure to be hired as a federal employee.69 The
EEOC erroneously relied on Spirides, which involved a fact situation
entirely distinct from DaVeiga.Y Spirides dealt with an individual with
a direct relationship with the Government, as either an independent
contractor or as an employee.7 DaVeiga, on the other hand, and
other decisions in which the EEOC had erroneously followed Spirides,
involved individuals with a critical intervening circumstance, i.e., an
employer, between the complaining individual and the Govern-
ment.72 That is, in Spirides there was privity between the individual
and the Government. In DaVeiga, privity was between DaVeiga and the
contractor, not the Government.
In summary, being "appointed" as a federal employee is a legal act
that carries with it corresponding rights and ramifications. Having a
contractual relationship with the government does not make an
individual an employee. It requires the legal act of appointment.
66. EEOC Req. No. 05930201 (July 13, 1993), 93 F.E.O.R. 1 3336.
67. DaVeiga v. Department of Air Force, EEOC Req. No. 05930201 (July 13, 1993), 93
F.E.O.R. 1 3336.
68. Id. The EEOC even took official note that she had filed a private sector EEOC charge
with the EEOC's Denver District Office against the contractor over the same issues.
69. 1&
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (describing Spirides and legal ramifications
of distinction between independent contractors and employee).
72. See, e.g., Puri v. Department of Army, EEOC Req. No. 05930502 (Mar. 24, 1994), 94
F.E.O.R. 1 3339 (involving complaints by individuals with employer intervening between
complainant and Government); Puri v. Department of Army, EEOC Req. No. 05920107 (Mar.
5, 1992) (same); Bandali v. Department of Labor, EEOC Req. No. 05910067 (Apr. 11, 1991)
(same); Shorten v. Agency for Int'l Dev., EEOC Req. No. 05901199 (Jan. 3,1991) (same); Najera
v. Department ofJustice, EEOC Req. No. 05900329 (May 3, 1990) (same). In the most recent
Pui decision, the EEOC reached the right decision for the wrong reason. It found that the
employee was a contractor employee and could not avail himself of the protections of Title VII
because of the indicia of "independent contractor" versus "employee" in Spinide. See P94
F.E.O.R. 1 3339, at XII-503. The case should have been disposed of on the correct basis that
the individual had never acquired "status" as a federal employee.
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Once appointed, an employee does not have an employment contract
with the Government, but a relationship, a "status" that draws its
essence from the legal act of appointment.
II. DEFINING THE BOUNDS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEE PROCEDURAL
PROTECTIONS
A. Legislative Expansion of Federal Employee Workplace Rights
During the September 1978 floor debates leading to the passage of
the Civil Service Reform Act,73 Representative John Rousellot noted
that while federal employees have more restrictions than their private
sector counterparts, federal employees enjoy benefits not generally
available to these private sector employees. 74
Those benefits, however, in the form of statutory protections not
enjoyed by private sector employees, were a long time coming. This
was due in part to another attribute of sovereignty that grew out of
the historical concept that "the King can do no wrong."75 For
federal employees, this translates to the principle of sovereign
immunity-that the sovereign cannot be sued unless the sovereign
consents to be sued. The rule of sovereign immunity was restated in
1976 in United States v. Testan,76 where the Court acknowledged that
it has long been established that the U.S. Government, as sovereign,
"is immune from suit, save as it consents to be sued."77 A corollary
to this principle is that any waiver of sovereign immunity is a limited
waiver, absent express congressional intent otherwise.7' Testan in-
volved a legal action brought by several Department of Defense
attorneys who wanted their positions (and as a result, their salaries)
upgraded. 79 Finding that the Federal Government had not extended
to these employees the right to make such a claim for relief, the
Court reviewed how Congress had granted federal employees limited
due process review rights late in the nineteenth century and early in
the twentieth century."0
73. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454,92 Stat. 1111 (codified at5 U.S.C.
§ 1101 note (1994)).
74. 124 CONG. REc. 29,200-02 (1978) (statement of Rep. Rousellot).
75. See BLACK'S LAW DIfrIONARY 1398 (6th ed. 1990) (defining sovereign immunity).
76. 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
77. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976).
78. Id. at 399 (citing United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); Seriano v. United States,
352 U.S. 280, 278 (1957)).
79. Id. at 392.
80. Id. at 397-98. Because employees were unable to fashion a claim for relief on a specific
statute waiving sovereign immunity against the United States, employees attempted to fashion
arguments based on a contract theory. Id, This, in turn, led courts to expound on the
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Until late in the nineteenth century, when the Government began
granting its employees limited due process review lights, the federal
sovereign had quite an arrangement. It could impose requirements
or other limitations on those appointed to government service, but
could fend off challenges from these same employees on the basis of
sovereign immunity.
1. Early statutory expansion offederal employee due process protections
Early in the first century of the Republic, there was no special
dispensation from the sovereign (either by legislative or executive fiat)
that granted incumbents in federal positions any job protection.8'
In fact, under the "spoils system," federal appointees were terminable
at the whim of the executive. 2 Also, the practice of "rotation" after
new elections or on the whim of an elected official were common.83
By the 1840s, the predominant view was that "political obligations of
public office holders took precedence over their public obligations"
and public employees were expected to "contribute time and money
('assessments') to political campaigns. Under these circumstances,
efficiency suffered and the career service was whittled to the bone."84
These circumstances led to a series of reform efforts, which ultimately
led Congress to enact legislation to return professionalism to the
career public service and end the "spoils system."85
The Pendleton Act,88 passed on June 16, 1883, marked the end of
the "spoils system," and the beginning of the merit system, and of the
expansion of statutory job protections for federal employees. The
Pendleton Act abolished the patronage system of employment and
provided for employment on the basis of merit.8 ' It also established
the Federal Civil Service Commission and prohibited consideration of
partisan political affiliation in the appointment process.'a As noted
by the Court in Testan, the Pendleton Act established that an
"appointment" concept and the special considerations of "status" that it brings to bear. &d
81. See ARI HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE SPOIS-A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
REFORM MOVEMENT 1864-1883, at 4-6 (1968).
82. I&
83. I&
84. Id. at 8.
85. Id. at 9-12.
86. Pendleton Act, ch. 27, § 2(2)1, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
87. Id.; see also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 381-82 (1983) (explaining provisions of
Pendleton Act).
88. Pendleton Act, ch. 27, § 2(2) 1, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
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employee remained entitled to emoluments of his position until he
became disqualified. 9
Although the Pendleton Act provided some limited protections
primarily aimed at entry into the federal service, it provided little
protection for employees who claimed that they were subjected to
alleged unwarranted personnel actions while on the job. Such
personnel actions, the Testan court noted, were simply an exercise in
legislative discretion: "For many years federal personnel actions were
viewed as entirely discretionary and therefore not subject to judicial
review, and in the absence of a statute eliminating that discretion,
courts refused to intervene where an employee claimed that he had
been wrongfully discharged."' For example, in Keim v. United
States,9 a Navy veteran, who was removed from his position on
grounds of inefficiency, sought legal redress.2 By denying the
veteran's claim, the Court conveyed a strong message as to the
agency's broad discretion in matters involving removal from the
federal service and of the requirement for express congressional
action providing a right or a remedy for the employee. The Court
found that, in the absence of some specific provision to the contrary,
the power of removal from a federal position was incident to the
power of appointment.93 The Court concluded that there were
certain matters that had been left to the province of those who had
supervisory authority, and "until Congress by some special and direct
legislation makes provision to the contrary, we are clear that they
must be settled by th[e]se administrative officers."' 4
The unilateral power of federal employers over federal employees
wvas greatly diminished by Congress in 1912. Congress acted in
response to issuances of two successive Executive Orders, one by
President Roosevelt in 1906 and the other by President Taft in 1909,
which imposed "gag orders" on federal employees from communicat-
ing with members of Congress unless they had their supervisors'
89. See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402 (1976) (citing United States v.
Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390 (1906)).
90. I at 406.
91. 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
92. Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900).
93. d. at 293.
94. Id. at 296.
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approval.95 Politically motivated removals were the source of this
congressional act.96
These federal employer abuses spurred "special and direct
legislation," as characterized by the Court in KeimY9  The Lloyd-
LaFollette Act of 1912 (Act)9 was enacted specifically "to protect
employees against oppression and in the right of free speech and the
right to consult their representatives.""° Several members of Con-
gress, who supported this legislation, believed that the Executive
Orders violated the First Amendment rights of federal employees.'l°
The Act was passed as section 6 of a postal appropriation statute in
1912.1 It provided that no person in the classified civil service
could be removed "'except for such cause as will promote the
efficiency of said service.'""12 The Act further granted employees
the right to receive notice of the proposed punitive action in writing,
and the right to a reasonable time to provide an answer to the
charges in writing. 0'
A thirty-two-year-period of relative quiet in legislative activity
followed the passage of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act. The next significant
statute passed was the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944,"o which
granted a preference in hiring to military veterans and granted an
enhanced retention standing to qualifying veterans already on the
rolls. 0 The Veteran's Preference Act also was significant in that it
extended the procedural and substantive protections of the 1912
Lloyd-LaFollette Act to adverse actions other than removals and added
a right to respond orally and to appeal to the Civil Service Commis-
sion. 06 In Bush v. Lucas,'°7 the Supreme Court undertook an
extensive review of the development of due process protections for
95. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 382-383 (1983) (providing historical review of
developments leading to passage of Civil Service Reform Act in reviewing whether federal
employees have cause of action for damages separate from relief provided under federal civil
service statutes granting various remedies to federal employees).
96. Id.
97. Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 296 (1900).
98. Ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555 (1912) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7102 (1994)).
99. Bush, 462 U.S. at 382 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 388, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1912)).
100. M at 383 n.20.
101. Id. at 383.
102. Id. (quoting Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555 (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 7101-7102 (1994)).
103. Id at 384.
104. Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 390 (codified in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C.).
105. Id
106. Id; see also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 365, 385-86 n.25 (1983) (explaining protections
provided in Veterans' Preference Act of 1944).
107. 462 U.S. 365 (1983).
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federal employees in the context of a federal employee who unsuc-
cessfully sought to have the Court recognize a new nonstatutory
damage remedy."~ The employee claimed that he had been
defamed and subjected to a retaliatory demotion. The Court declined
to grant the remedy, commenting that "[diuring the past centu-
ry... the job security of federal employees has steadily increased.""°
2. Recent statutory expansion offederal employee due process rights
The dramatic expansion of statutory due process rights for civilian
employees began with the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.11 The amendments codified the right of federal employ-
ees to file complaints alleging unlawful discrimination in employment
related matters."' The amendments also authorized federal em-
ployees who exhausted administrative remedies to initiate a de novo
judicial action in federal district court" 2  The 1972 expansion of
equal employment opportunity rights to federal employees was
followed by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA).113 The
CSRA implemented a massive revamping of the civil service system.
It redistributed various functions that formerly had been performed
by the Civil Service Commission to several new agencies." 4 In
addition, the CSRA retained and expanded on the Lloyd-LaFollette
108. Bush, 462 U.S. at 388-89.
109. Id. at 382.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
111. Id. § 2000e-16.
112. Id.
113. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454,92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). The original stated intent of the Civil Service Reform Act was
to make it easier to hire and fire federal employees. See S. REP. No. 95-969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2726 (reporting legislative history of CSRA). In
practice this has not happened, but provisions of the Act have become bulwarks of due process
protection for civilian employees. The CSRA retained the Lloyd-LaFollette Act's "efficiency of
[the] service" standard for taking adverse action against employees. Lloyd-LaFollette Act of
1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7102 (1994)). The
CSRA provided a statutory basis for performance-based actions, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2301
(1994).
114. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,92 Star. at 1111. Former adjudicatory functions of the
old Civil Service Commission were divided into several new agencies. Appeals from actions
taken to promote the efficiency of the service and for unacceptable performance were vested
in a new adjudicatory agency, the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Id. An Office
of Special Counsel (OSC) was created as a part of the MSPB to investigate employee complaints
of prohibited personnel practices and reprisal against employees for having made whistleblower
disclosures. Pub. L. No. 95-454,92 Stat. 1121-22 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1105 (1994)). Oversight
and adjudicatory review authority over federal sector labor relations matters was vested in a new
agency, the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1196
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7104 (1994)). Oversight and general authority over the federal civilian
personnel system was transferred from the former Civil Service Commission (CSC) to a successor
agency, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). 92 Stat. 1119 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§
1101-1105 (1994)).
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Act's and the Veterans' Preference Act's procedural due process for
federal employees in adverse personnel actions."5 The CSRA also
provided a statutory basis for federal labor management relations,
extending by statute the right of federal employees to engage in
collective bargaining."6
Although the CSRA created an Office of Special Counsel to handle
whistleblower complaints, Congress responded to continuing com-
plaints, from employees and organizations representing employees,
that reprisals remained common against employees who made
disclosures of fraud, waste, and abuse in government operations.
Congress addressed these concerns specifically in the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989,"' which marked the next significant expan-
sion of the due process rights of federal employees." 8
The congressional pace since 1991 has been rapid-fire. First came
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991."9 This legislation
115. See supra note 181.
116. See5 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7135 (1994). While the focus of this Article is on individual rights,
the collective rights granted employees in the Civil Service Reform Act's (CSRA) Title VII
represent a wholesale expansion of due process rights for federal employees who are covered
under collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). In addition to recognizing by statute the right
of employees to bargain collectively, Title VII established a separate and elaborate regulatory
scheme for resolving employee workplace grievances and bargaining issues. See.S. REp. No. 95-
969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 2723, 2821-37. This legislation
created the FLRA, see 92 Stat. at 1196, and the Federal Services Impasses Panel (FSIP), 92 Stat.at
1208-09, and permits federal agencies and unions to use the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service to assist in resolving workplace disputes. See 92 Stat. at 1215.
117. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201 note, 1205, 1211-22 (1994)). For an excellent discussion of the history and
development of the Office of Special Counsel and the development of whistleblower rights for
federal employees, see Bruce D. Fong, Whistleblower Protection and the Office of Special Counsek The
Development of Reprisal Law in the 1980s, 40 AM. U. L REv. 1015 (1991). The Whistleblower
Protection Act (WPA) took the Office of Special Counsel out of the MSPB and vested it with
independent investigatory authority over complaints of prohibited personnel practices and
whistleblower reprisal by federal employees. See 103 Stat. at 19-21. The WPA provided
additional protections for employees making such complaints and made it more difficult for
agencies to deny that reprisal had been a factor in personnel actions taken against employees
once the Office of Special Counsel had made threshold findings. See id.
118. Under the CSRA, the Office of Special Counsel was established as an investigatory and
prosecutorial arm of the MSPB to investigate complaints by federal employees of prohibited
personnel practices and complaints by employees that they had been subjected to reprisal for
having disclosed gross fraud, waste and abuse (whistleblowing). See92 Stat. at 1125-31. It also
was given jurisdiction over enforcement of the Hatch Act. See id. at 1128. The WPA retained
responsibilities for the Office of Special Counsel but established it as an independent agency to
strengthen its authority and role. See 103 Stat. at 19-21. The WPA also altered the nature of the
statutory burdens on employees and agencies, making it easier for employees to make a claim
that whistleblower reprisal had occurred and imposing a higher burden on management to
prove that a particular personnel action taken against an employee was not in reprisal for having
made protected disclosures of fraud, waste and abuse. See id.
119. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C.§§ 1202-1224, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 note, 1981a, 1988, 2000e note (Supp. V 1993)). In terms of
substantive due process rights for federal employees, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA)
legislatively overruled Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), making it easier
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permits federal employees who prevail in employment discrimination
cases to be awarded up to $300,000 in compensatory damages.1 20
It also permits employees, if they pursue judicial action after
exhausting administrative remedies, to receive a jury trial in federal
district court.'2 ' The EEOC has since determined that the compen-
satory damage provisions are available for federal employees in its
administrative proceedings, in addition to proceedings in federal
courts.122 The MSPB has also extended the compensatory damage
provisions to discrimination cases coming before it on appeal.'2
The next statute affecting federal employees did not expand the
existing body of due process rights to employees who already had
them, but instead extended existing rights to federal employees who
formerly had extremely limited appeal rights to the MSPB, and hence
to the Federal Circuit-employees in the "excepted service."2  The
Civil Service Due Process Amendments of 199012 expanded due
process protections in adverse actions to federal employees appointed
in the excepted service.'26 Additionally, the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1992127 apply certain provisions of the Americans
for complainants, including federal sector complainants, in disparate impact discrimination cases
to establish statistically that systemic discrimination has occurred, and requiring defendants,
including the Government, to establish a defense of business necessity to avoid liability.
120. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. at 1071. Section 102 of the CRA added provisions
that authorize the awarding of compensatory damages against public sector employers in cases
where intentional discrimination is found. Private sector employers are subject to both
compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination. IM. The CRA caps damage
awards depending on the number of employees of each employer, as respondents with more
than 500 employees are subject to a maximum $300,000 per complainant. Id., 105 Stat. at 1073.
For purposes of applying the caps to federal agencies, the EEOC has determined that "agency"
equates to "employer," meaning that for most federal agencies, the $300,000 cap applies. See
Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory & Punitive Damages Available Under § 102 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 14, 1992). The provisions on caps are
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (Supp. V 1993).
121. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. at 1072-73.
122. SeeJackson v. United States Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01923399, Nov. 12, 1992,93
F.E.O.R 1 3062, req. for raconsid, den., EEOC Req. No. .05930306, Feb. 1, 1993, 94 F.E.O.R.
13333.
123. See Hocker v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 63 M.S.P.R. 497 (1994).
124. Se 5 U.S.C. § 2103 (1994). "Excepted service" positions are defined as "civil service
positions which are not in the competitive service or the Senior Executive Service." I.; see also
5 C.F.R. § 213 (1995) (dividing excepted service positions into three excepted service schedules,
with each schedule based upon whether position is of confidential and policy determining
character).
125. Pub. L. No. 101-376, 104 Star. 461 (1990) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501 note, 7511,7701
(1994)).
126. Id. The Act granted appeal rights to the MSPB to excepted service employees provided
that they have completed a two-year probationary period. Id. Previously, only those excepted
service employees who were veterans were granted appeal rights in adverse actions to the MSPB.
127. Pub. L. No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4344 (1992) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp.V 1993)).
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With Disabilities Act128 to the federal sector,129 thereby expanding
the category of individuals able to assert claims of disability discrimi-
nation.' s0
The most recent expansion of federal employee statutory due
process rights occurred in a statute with the nondescriptive title of the
Office of Special Counsel Reauthorization Act (Special Counsel
Act)."' The title is nondescriptive because it is much more than a
reauthorization statute. Like the Civil Service Due Process Amend-
ments of 1990,132 the Special Counsel Act increases the coverage of
federal workers entitled to due process rights."3 Now, employees
of the Veterans' Administration in excepted service health care
positions not formerly covered under Title 5 merit systems laws are
granted statutory protections, including MSPB appeal rights in adverse
actions."s  Additionally, whistleblower protection rights have been
extended to employees of certain government corporations, such as
the Resolution Trust Corporation'35 and the Thrift Depositor
Protection Oversight Board.136  This legislation, however, also
expands substantive due process rights for federal employees by
adding two new definitions of personnel actions to those that can be
the subject of a whistleblower reprisal claim.' Thus, an employee
whose supervisor refers him for psychiatric testing or examination, or
subjects the employee to "any other significant change in duties,
responsibilities or working conditions""3 can claim that these
actions are in reprisal for having engaged in protected activity.'"
"Protected activity" means that the employee has made lawful
128. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
V 1993)). This legislation is applicable to private sector, not public sector, employees. Id.
129. The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992 amended the Rehabilitation Act to make
provisions of Title I and §§ 501-504 and § 510 (as such sections relate to employment) of the
Americans With Disabilities Act applicable to the federal sector.
130. See, ag., Gholston v. Department of Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01941795 (July 5, 1994)
in which a federal employee discrimination complaint was found to have been improperly
dismissed by the agency. The employee claimed that he had been subjected to discrimination
based on his association with a non-employee, his wife, who suffered from a disability. Id. The
EEOC found that Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, made applicable to the federal
sector in the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, authorized the discrimination complaint
on this basis. [d.
131. Pub. L. No. 103-424, § 7, 108 Stat. 4361 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5509 note (1994)).
132. Civil Service Due Process Amendments, Pub. L No. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461 (codified at
5 U.S.C. § 7511 (1994)).
133. Office of Special Counsel Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-424, § 7, 108 Stat. 4361
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5509 note (1994)).
134. See § 7, 108 Stat. at 4364 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2105(0 (1994)).
135. See § 11, 108 Star. at 4366 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1441a note (1994)).
136. I.
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disclosure of suspected fraud, waste, or abuse by government
personnel.
It is also necessary to consider the impact of an October 1, 1993
Executive Order1" granting federal sector unions expanded authori-
ty to engage in collective bargaining."' The Executive Order
requires that federal management engage in collective bargaining with
unions representing federal sector employees over subjects that were
formerly permissive subjects of bargaining." In a strict sense, the
terms of the Executive Order do not expand individual due process
rights for federal employees, but the order does constitute a collective
expansion of the authority of federal employees. Formerly, manage-
ment could dictate a policy by declaring a permissive subject non-
negotiable and an employee who violated the policy could be
subjected to possible sanctions.143
The substantial expansion of federal sector employee due process
rights and protections since 1972 is remarkable. Prior to that time,
the principal administrative forum for federal employee complaints
was the Civil Service Commission. Today; no fewer than five adminis-
trative adjudicatory agencies have the authority to grant or pursue
relief for employees-the Office of Personnel Management (OPM),
the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB), the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), and the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). The
range of rights and categories of employees covered by these rights
has expanded in kind.
B. Legislative Restriction of Federal Employee Rights
In a lengthy and reasoned discussion of the Government's constitu-
tional authority to regulate ex ante the conduct of its employees, the
140. Exec. Order No. 12,871, 3 C.F.R. 655 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1994).
141. Id. Section 2(d) directs agency managers to negotiate with unions over subjects of
bargaining covered in 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b) (1). See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b) (I) (1994) (describing
bargaining subjects such as numbers, types and grades of employees or positions assigned to any
organizational subdivision, work project or tour of duty, or technology, methods and means of
performing work).
142. See Exec. Order No. 12,871, 3 C.F.R. 655 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1994).
143. In AFGE v. Department of Air Force, 37 F.LRA. 197 (1990), the Air Force advised the
union that it planned to install new security gates along the base's flightline to upgrade security
in light of potential terrorist attacks. Id. at 201. The union proposed that any employees who
were late to work for a tour of duty be insulated from discipline if the tardiness was due to a
malfunction of the new gates; and if they were held beyond their tour of duty by a gate
malfunction, that they get overtime pay. Id. at 204. The FLRA held that the agency could not
be made to bargain over the first part of the proposal (discipline for being tardy to a tour of
duty), but that the second provision regarding overtime pay was negotiable under a separate
provision of federal law. Id. at 205. The Executive Order could have caused the FLRA to take
a different approach to the Robins Air Force Base case, which might have affected the outcome.
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Supreme Court in 1946 declared the 1940 Hatch Ace' constitution-
al.'4 The Hatch Act regulates participation by federal and state
employees in the partisan political process, and alternatively imposes
restrictions on any person from attempting to inject partisan politics
into the federal civil service system. The Hatch Act's prohibition on
active involvement in the partisan political process led several
Executive Branch employees and a public employee union to attack
the Act's scope as unconstitutional soon after its 1940 passage. 41
In United Public Workers v. Mitchell,V '47 the Court recognized that
essential First Amendment rights "in some instances are subject to the
elemental need for order without which the guarantees of civil rights
to others would be a mockery."" To achieve this "order," the
Court recognized Congress' power, "within reasonable limits," to
regulate the conduct of its employees.1 49 Justice O'Connor elaborat-
ed on this notion in Waters, wryly observing that when an employee
accepts a government paycheck to assist in an agency's effective
operations, this act carries with it the power of the Government to
impose restraints on employee conduct. 50 The power of the
Government to impose restraints on employee conduct has its greatest
impact on federal employees in the following areas: (1) restrictions
on participation in strikes against federal employers; (2) restrictions
on engaging in certain partisan political activities and prohibitions
concerning acceptance of gifts; and (3) restrictions on engaging in
outside employment or related activities that could create an
appearance of impropriety to the general public.' Prior to review-
ing how the Court has addressed regulation of ex ante conduct of
federal employees, a review of these restrictions is helpful.
1. Restrictions on right to strike
One of the more dramatic restraints imposed by the Government
on its workforce is the prohibition against striking.52 Congress, in
144. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 595
(1994)).
145. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-104 (1946).
146. See infra note 281.
147. 330 U.S. 75 (1946).
148. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95 (1946).
149. Id. at 96.
150. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1888-89 (1994).
151. See infra Part II.B.1-3.
152. The Government has had a long history of regulating the conduct of its employees vis-a-
vis organizations which might promote strikes against the Government. See Lloyd-LaFollette Act
of 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555 (permitting postal employees to join in any organization
not affiliated with outside organizations that impose obligations or duties upon them to engage
in strikes or assist in strikes against the United States).
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imposing limitations on who may work for the Federal Govern-
ment, 53 has provided that an individual may not accept or hold a
federal position if the individual "participates in a strike, or asserts the
right to strike against the Government of the United States."" This
regulation is buttressed by the "appointment affidavit" that new
federal employees are required by law to execute in which the
employee must agree not to violate the no-strike statutory provi-
sion."'5 The law affirmatively states that the employee's execution
of the affidavit constitutes prima facie evidence that the employee
does not or will not violate the no-strike provision. 156 An equivalent
provision exists in the federal criminal statutes, providing that
whoever participates in a strike or asserts the right to strike in
violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7311, "shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year and a day, or both."
157
The statutory prohibitions on striking by federal employees have
not gone unchallenged."~ The provision that subjects employees
to sanctions if they "assert a right to strike" as opposed to actually
participating in a strike has been held unconstitutional due to
vagueness.'59 In United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount,l" the
union attacked this provision directly, contending that federal
employees had a constitutional right to strike."' The action was
brought by a public employee labor organization which was the
executive bargaining representative of approximately 305,000 U.S.
postal clerks. 2 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive
153. See, e-g., 5 U.S.C. § 3103 (1994) (imposing limitation on individuals employed at seat
of government); id. § 3110 (placing limitations on hiring of relatives of those already employed
by Federal Government); id. § 3106 (placing restrictions on employment of attorneys); id. § 3326
(imposing restrictions on employment of retired military with Department of Defense); id.
§ 3301 (permitting President to prescribe other limitations by regulation which best promote
efficiency of civil service).
154. d § 7311(3).
155. I/. § 3333(a).
156. It
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1994).
158. See National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546, 550 (D.D.C. 1969)
(holding that statute prohibiting federal employees from striking violated First Amendment),
appeal dimissed; 400 U.S. 801 (1970). But see United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F.
Supp. 879, 884 (D.D.C. 1970), affd. 404 U.S. 802 (1971) (ruling that statutory provisions do not
violate constitutional rights of federal employees).
159. Letter Carders, 305 F. Supp. at 550. A union representing 6000 collective bargaining
units comprised of postal employees sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was
unconstitutional. Id. at 547. The court found that only the provision pertaining to asserting the
right to strike was vague and held that it was severable from the remainder of the statute. Id.
at 556.
160. 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C.), af/'d. 404 U.S. 802 (1971).
161. United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 881 (D.D.C.), aft'd, 404 U.S.
802 (1971).
162. Id.
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relief to invalidate the no-strike statute and the criminal penalties
accompanying it.1" The district court rejected their attack, holding
that there is no constitutional right to strike in either the public or
the private sector and that the Federal Government, "whether because
of the prerogatives of the sovereign, some sense of higher obligation
associated with public service, to assure the continuing functioning of
the Government without interruption, to protect the public health
and safety, or for other reasons,""6 could prohibit its employees
from striking. The court traced various legislative enactments over
the years prohibiting strikes by government employees, including
provisions in various appropriations acts prohibiting agencies from
using government funds to pay the salaries of those who engaged in
strikes. 65
The greatest source of litigation spawned by the no-strike statute
came from the 1981 strike by air traffic controllers who were members
of the Professional Air Traffic Controller's Organization (PATCO).
On August 3, 1981, after months of unsuccessful negotiations, more
than 13,000 PATCO members nationwide commenced a strike against
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).' 66 The strike began at
seven a.m.' 67 The Government responded by sending telegrams to
those employees who failed to report for work, advising them that the
strike was illegal and that they risked disciplinary action and possible
criminal penalties if they participated in it." Employees were also
advised to report as scheduled for duty unless they were directed
otherwise by their managers. The telegrams were followed by a
public announcement made by President Reagan at eleven a.m.
advising those who failed to report to work that they would be given
a forty-eight-hour grace period, but if they did not return to work
within that time, they would be deemed to have forfeited their job
and would be removed from federal employment. 7 ° Thereafter,
the FAA issued notices of proposed removal to each controller who
failed to report for duty on the first shift to which the controller was
to have reported after the August 5, 1981, eleven a.m. deadline.'7 '
163. Id. at 880.
164. Id. at 883.
165. Id. at 882.
166. See United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1231 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210
(1983).
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In the ensuing litigation before the Federal Circuit in which scores
of individual cases were appealed from the MSPB and consolidated
for hearing and decision, only two reported decisions involved
constitutional issues; none of the cases were frontal assaults on the
Government's authority to prohibit employees from striking. 72 The
Federal Circuit's principal decision on striking that arose from the air
traffic controller decisions was Schapansky v. Department of Transporta-
tion (FAA). 73 In response to the appellant's claim that it was
improper to discipline him because the FAA had not proven that he
had the specific intent to violate the no-strike statute, the court held
that proof of general intent was sufficient to establish a violation. 7
4
The court stated that an employee's unexplained absence during a
strike, which was of general knowledge to everyone, was sufficient to
establish intent. 75 Other cases dealt with factual issues concerning
the strike176 or procedural issues 77 concerning the discipline im-
posed on the employees.
Attacks on the criminal no-strike statute also have been unsuccess-
ful. For example, in United States v. Greene,78 three senior officials
172. See Brown v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 735 F.2d 543, 546 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(discussing whether Government's prohibition on striking by federal employees violates First
Amendment); DiMasso v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 735 F.2d 526, 527 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(refusing to uphold employee's contention that failure to advise him of his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination constituted violation of Fifth Amendment); see also Moulan v.
Department of Transp. (FAA), 735 F.2d 524, 525 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (rejecting employee's
contention that consolidation of his case with 79 other cases denied him fair opportunity to be
heard by MSPB).
173. 735 F.2d 477 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
174. Schapansky v. Department ofTransp. (FAA), 735 F.2d 477, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
175. It. at 484.
176. See, eg., Letenyei v. Department ofTransp. (FAA), 735 F.2d 528, 534 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(ruling that provisions of collective bargaining agreement between union and agency prevented
agency from canceling employee's leave and ordering him to return to work); Dorrance v.
Department of Transp. (FAA), 735 F.2d 516, 520 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (rejecting appellant's claim
that unsupported testimony of main witness against him was insufficient to sustain his dismissal);
Johnson v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 735 F.2d 510, 515 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that
threat of physical harm to federal employee by striking co-workers does not constitute affirmative
defense to disciplinary action against him); Martel v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 735 F.2d
504, 509-10 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that appellant's contention that he was intimidated into
striking by co-workers is insufficient to overturn his dismissal for striking); Adams v. Department
ofTransp. (FAA), 735 F.2d 488, 493-94 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (rejecting employees' contention that
government officials created so much confusion over presidential deadline that it affected their
ability to form intent to strike).
177. See, eg., Anderson v. Department ofTransp. (FAA), 735 F.2d 537,540 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(refusing to uphold claim that disciplinary action was improper because of denial of opportunity
to present oral reply to notice of removal); Novomy v. Department ofTransp. (FAA), 735 F.2d
521 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (deciding that agency action was proper despite lack of independent
investigation into allegations against employee); Campbell v. Department ofTransp. (FAA), 735
F.2d 497, 500 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (deciding that agency does not have to schedule oral reply to
notice of removal sua sponte, but rather employee must "take initiative to schedule time to
exercise right").
178. 697 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983).
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of PATCO chapters in the Dallas, Texas area were indicted and
convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1918(3) for participating in an
illegal strike. 9 They each received jail sentences and fines of $750,
and each appealed the convictions."t The court held that the
criminal statute was not void for vagueness and stated that the senior
officials' arguments on that point were diminished by evidence that
they were on notice of the no-strike law.181
2. Restrictions on political activity
A second area where Congress restricted the rights of federal
employees concerns political activity. The Government's regulation
of employee political activity harkens back to earlier congressional
efforts to end the political patronage system that existed in the early
1800s. One such effort was the Pendleton Act'" of 1883, which had
dual purposes. Its first purpose centered on the creation of a merit
system by which all applicants for federal employment could receive
fair and equal treatment."8 The second purpose focused on
protecting federal employees from political retaliation."8 Congress
accomplished this by codifying the first limits on public employee
political activity, one aspect of which was protecting employees from
unjustified removals for political purposes." The Pendleton Act,
however, also imposed restrictions on public employee conduct by
prohibiting public employees from using their official authority or
influence to coerce the political action of any person18 6 and prevent-
ing them from giving political contributions to other government
employees.18 7 After the passage of the Pendleton Act, the Govern-
ment regulated employee political conduct through Civil Service
Commission rules and Executive Orders."8
179. United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1231 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210
(1983).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1233.
182. Pendleton Act, ch. 27, § 13, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
183. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 381 (1983) (explaining that Pendleton Act "provided
for selection of federal civil servants on a merit basis" and that Act proscribed firing federal
employees who refused to contribute to political funds).
184. See id. at 381-82 (discussing politically motivated removals).
185. See Pendleton Act, § 13, 22 Stat. at 407 (prohibiting discharge or demotion of federal
employee for giving, withholding, or neglecting to make political contribution for political
purposes).
186. Id. § 2.
187. Id. § 14.
188. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 79-82 (1947) (explaining history of
rights and regulations of federal employees during time between Pendleton Act (1883) and
Hatch Act (1939)).
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The Hatch Act, styled to "prevent pernicious political activities,""s9
marked the next significant step taken by Congress to limit political
activity by government employees. The Hatch Act was broad in scope.
It regulated not only federal employee conduct, but also certain
conduct by "any person." "°  For example, the Hatch Act made it
unlawful for any person to intimidate or coerce voters in national
elections,1 91 to promise employment, compensation or any benefit
to any person in return for support or opposition to any political
party in any election,' 92 to engage in discrimination, 93 or to fur-
nish or disclose lists or names of persons receiving funds for work
relief or relief purposes to a political candidate, campaign manager,
or other person connected with a political campaign.194
The operative provisions of the Hatch Act that directly limited the
political conduct of federal employees were two-fold. The first
provision dealt with the problem of trading official positions for
private gain by making it unlawful for any person employed in the
executive branch, agency, or department of the Federal Government
to use "official authority or position" to influence or interfere in
elections. 95 The second provision directly implicated inherent
constitutional freedoms by proscribing all officers and employees in
the executive branch of the Federal Government from taking "any
active part in political management or in political campaigns."1 9
Both provisions exempted the President, the Vice President, employ-
ees of the President's executive office, cabinet officials, other
government officials appointed with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and others who were charged with high level foreign and
domestic policymaking.' 9 The penalty for violating either provi-
189. Act of Aug. 2, 1939 (Hatch Act), ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939).
190. See . § 1 (stating that it is unlawful for "any person" to intimidate, threaten, or coerce
any other person to vote or not vote for candidates for national political office); i& § 2 (stating
that it is unlawful for "any person" employed by United States to use official authority to
interfere in national election); id § 3 (stating that it is unlawful for "any person" to promise
employment or other benefit to "any person" as favor or award for political activity in support
of or opposition to any candidate or any political party in any election).
191. l& § 1.
192. § 3.
193. IML § 4.
194. 1& § 6. The phrase "work relief or relief purposes" referred to persons who might be
receiving an early form of public assistance which varied among states and localities, the current
equivalent of which would be worker's compensation or unemployment compensation. The
concern was that such individuals could be particularly susceptible to pressures to assist in a
political campaign.
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sion, by using official position or active participation, was immediate
removal from government employment. 98
In 1940, Congress expanded the Hatch Act to prohibit certain state
officials and employees from interfering with or attempting to
influence national elections,199 and provided an extensive hearing
and appellate process under Civil Service Commission procedures.2°°
The 1940 amendments added limits to the aggregate amounts of
campaign contributions that could be made by "any person," °0
extended coverage to District of Columbia employees," 2 and
authorized the Civil Service Commission to exempt certain municipal
and political subdivisions in the immediate vicinity of the District of
Columbia from prohibitions of the Act.2 3 Other 1940 amendments
included prohibitions on contributions by persons or firms having
government contracts t 4 and limitations on receipts and expenditures
of political committees.0" Though there were certain minor
subsequent amendments, the Hatch Act remained substantially
unchanged until 1993.206
The Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 199307 were an attempt
by Congress to grant more freedom to federal employees to partici-
pate in the national political process.2" The statute's preamble
originally was stated in the negative: "[a]n employee ... is not
obligated, by reason of that employment, to contribute to a political
fund or to render political service."2" This changed in 1993 to a
more open and expansive statement of purpose, on its face encourag-
ing employee participation in the political process."0 This theme
198. M § 9(b).
199. 1940 Amendments to Hatch Act, ch. 640, § 2, 54 Stat. 767 (1946) (current version at
5 U.S.C. §§ 7324-7327 (1994)).
200. Md § 12(b).
201. IM § 13.
202. I. § 15.
203. Id. § 16.
204. Id. § 19.
205. Id, § 20.
206. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-7326 (1994) (representing latest incarnation of Hatch Act
provisions).
207. Pub. L. No. 103-93, 107 Stat. 1001 (1993) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321-
7326 (1994)). Pursuant to § 13 of the Hatch ActAmendments of 1994, the new provisions took
effect February 3, 1994.
208. Id. § 2(a).
209. See Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 525 (1966).
210. SeePub. L No. 103-94, § 2(a), 107 Stat. 1001 (1993) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 7321 (1994)) (providing that "[eimployees should be encouraged to exercise fully, freely, and
without fear of penalty or reprisal, and to the extent not expressly prohibited by law, their right
to participate or refrain from participating in the political process of the Nation").
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continues through the statute, where provisions are stated in the
affirmative, followed by any enumerated prohibitions.2 '
While Congress attempted to simplify participation by federal
employees in the political process, it actually only complicated the
system. The former Hatch Act contained no express exclusion from
its provisions for particular federal agencies or departments.1 2 The
Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, however, contain an
extensive list of agencies and departments excluded from the new
213provisions, meaning, in essence, that most federal employees are
covered by the new provisions, but employees of agencies excluded
from the new provisions remain covered by requirements of the old
law.214
The Hatch Act Amendments of 1993 also contain a new substantive
provision prohibiting political activities while on duty.215 For First
Amendment purposes, there are provisions which, with a new level of
specificity, prohibit employees from engaging in political activity while
on duty, while wearing a uniform or other official insignia identifying
the office or position of the employee, or while using a government
vehicle. 21 '6  The statute gives the OPM the authority to promulgate
regulations implementing these new provisions.1 7 OPM has pub-
lished interim regulations that impose new First Amendment-related
restrictions based on the new statute, curtailing employee freedom of
expression permitted under prior regulations.218  For example,
under OPM's former Hatch Act regulations,219 employees were
211. See Pub. L. No. 103-94, 107 Stat. 1002 (codified as amended at5 U.S.C. § 7323 (1994))
(stating how employees may participate in political management or political campaigns, but then
listing exceptions to employee involvement in political activities). The exceptions state that
employees may not: (1) use official authority to influence election; (2) solicit, accept or receive
political contributions except in certain circumstances; (3) run for nomination/be candidate
for partisan political office; and (4) knowingly solicit or discourage political activity. Id.
212. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 525 (1966).
213. Pub. L. No. 103-94, 107 Stat. 1003 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7323 (1994)).
214. S e OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES COVERED UNDER
THE NEW HATCH ACT AMENDMENTS (on file with The American University Law Review). The Office
of Special Counsel lists agencies, or divisions within an agency, that continue to be covered by
the old law. These include the Federal Elections Commission, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Secret Service, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, National Security Agency,
Defense Intelligence Agency, Merit Systems Protection Board, Office of Special Counsel, Office
of Criminal Investigation of the Internal Revenue Service, Office of Investigative Programs of
the Customs Service, Office of Law Enforcement of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
Agency, Criminal Division of the Department of'Justice, career members of the Senior Executive
Service, Administrative LawJudges, and contract appeals board members. Id.
215. Pub. L No. 103-94, 107 Star. 1003 (1993) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7324
(1994)).
216. Id.
217. Pub. L. No. 103-97, § 2, 107 Stat. 1001, 1004 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7325 (1994)).
218. 59 Fed. Reg. 48,765 (1994) (codified at 5 C.F.R. §§ 734.301 to .307 (1995)).
219. 5 C.F.R. § 733 (1995).
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permitted to display a political picture, sticker, badge, or button.22 °
Under the new OPM regulations prohibiting workplace political
activity, an employee covered by the Hatch Act amendments cannot
display a political picture, sticker, badge, or button in a government
office while on duty.22' The OPM regulations specify that a federal
employee who drives a privately owned vehicle on official business,
and who consequently receives compensation for mileage, may display
a political bumper sticker on the automobile, "as long as he covers
the bumper sticker while the vehicle is being used for official
duties. "222 These new restrictions, however, are only for employees
who come under the new Hatch Act amendments, not for employees
who remain covered by the old law. The distinction comes from the
manner in which Congress exempted certain agencies from provisions
of the new law, while not repealing the former law outright, which
applied broadly to employees of all agencies.2  Potentially, within
the same building occupied by different federal agencies, employees
of an agency exempt from the new amendments could display a
political button while their counterparts in a covered agency could
not display one.224
3. Restrictions set forth in the Ethics in Government Act
Congress also limited the activities of federal employees through
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.21 The Ethics in Govern-
ment Act concerns employees' conduct in relation to accepting gifts
in their capacities as employees from non-federal sources, accepting
gifts from other federal employees, owning financial interests that
might pose conflicts with their official government duties; restrictions
on accepting or engaging in off-duty employment; and restrictions on
other activities outside their regular government employment, such
220. Id. § 733.111(a)(3).
221. 59 Fed. Reg. 48,765, 48,773 (1994) (codified at 5 C.F.R. § 734.306(a) (1995)).
222. Id at 48,773.
223. Thus, in § 7323(b)(2)(B), Congress exempted employees of the Federal Election
Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Council, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Office of Special Counsel, the Office of
Criminal Investigation of the Internal Revenue Service, the Office of Investigative Programs of
the Customs Service, and the Office of Law Enforcement of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms from the statute. Yet the employees of these agencies remain subject to the
provisions of the former law. The Office of Personnel Management has issued a separate new
regulation that governs only these agencies, restating the old prohibitions. See5 C.F.R. § 734(D)
(1995).
224. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (describing exemptions and restrictions on
political expression for government employees).
225. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 101 app.
(1994)).
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as teaching, speaking, writing, or engaging in fundraising activi-
ties.2 26
The Ethics in Government Act was an across the board attempt to
place employees of all three branches of government under uniform
financial disclosure procedures. 2' Titles I, II, and III provided
financial disclosure requirements for legislative branch personnel, 28
executive branch personnel,2' and judicial personnel, respective-
ly.2 ° Title IV created the Office of Government Ethics as an entity
within the OPM,231 where it remained for several years until it
became a separate federal agency.2 2
The Ethics Reform Act of 198923 constituted a wholesale revision
of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. The Ethics Reform Act
codified what formerly had been restrictions imposed upon federal
employees by regulation. Title II of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989
rewrote the financial disclosure requirements for federal person-
nel2 ' and Title III provided statutory guidance on what federal
employees could or could not do with respect to accepting gifts and
travel.21 Post-employment restrictions on executive and legislative
branch personnel were strengthened and clarified in Title I of the
Act.21 Title VI of the Ethics Reform Act amended Title V of the
Ethics in Government Act to create statutory limitations on outside
employment for members of Congress and certain senior level
executive branch employees and to impose a bar on the acceptance
of honoraria by all federal employees. 7 These limitations have
been codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 501 and were the source of the
constitutional attack in NThU 3M 8 Unlike the Hatch Act and the no-
226. See5 C.F.R. § 2635 (1995) (noting regulations concerning ethical conduct by executive
branch officials).
227. SeeS. REP. No. 95-170,95th Cong., 2d Sess, 21, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4217,4237
("It was the opinion of the majority of wimesses... that any requirements for public financial
disclosure should apply uniformly across the board to high level officials in the executive,
judicial and legislative branches of the government.").
228. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, Title 1, 92 Stat 1824-36
(1978) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 101 app. (1994)).
229. Id. at Title II, 92 Stat at 1836-50 (1978).
230. Id. at Title III, 92 Stat. at 1851-61 (1978).
231. Id. at Title IV, 92 Stat. at 1862-64 (1978).
232. Pub. L. No. 100-598, 102 Stat. 3031 (1988) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 401-408
(1994)).
233. Pub. L No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505
(1994)).
234. Id. atTitle II, 103 Star. at 1724-45 (1989) (codified at5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-112 (1994)).
235. Id. atTitle III, 103 Stat. at 1745-47 (1989) (amending5 U.S.C. §§ 7351, 7363 (1994) and
31 U.S.C. § 1352 (Supp. V 1993)).
236. Id. at Tite I, 103 Stat. at 1716-24 (1989) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 101 note (1994)).
237. Id., 103 Stat. at 1760-63 (1989) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 501 (1994)).
238. United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
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strike statutes, there is no express statutory penalty concerning
removal from the federal service.2 9 The Ethics Reform Act, howev-
er, permits the Attorney General to bring a civil action against a
covered individual who violates either the outside employment
prohibition or the honoraria prohibition.21 If an action is brought,
potential sanctions include a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000, or
the amount of the compensation received, whichever is greater.24'
Additionally, the Office of Government Ethics has implemented
regulations to advise agencies that disciplinary action can be taken in
addition to the statutory penalties imposed on employees who violate
the Ethics in Govemment Act, as amended by the Ethics Reform
Act 24  The disciplinary penalties include reprimand, suspension,
demotion, and removal.24
C. Judicial Limiting Factors
Notwithstanding the extensive legislation Congress has provided for
the protection of the rights of federal employees, one cardinal
principle of sovereign immunity remains. Before a court can
intercede against the sovereign on an employee's behalf, Congress
must have authorized such judicial action. A 1976 case illustrates this
principle. United States v. Hopkin.?4 involved the widow of a de-
ceased federal employee who claimed, on her husband's behalf, that
he had been wrongfully discharged from employment in violation of
an implied employment contract.21 The decedent did not fall
within the statutory protections for wrongful discharge afforded to
appointed employees because of his status as an employee paid from
nonappropriated funds.2' The Supreme Court noted that "absent
specific command of statute or authorized regulation, an appointed
employee subjected to unwarranted personnel action does not have
a cause of action against the United States."247
The reluctance of courts to interject into everyday workplace
disputes involving federal employees acts as another limiting factor on
judicial activity. In Gnotta v. United States,21 for example, a disgrun-
239. Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. at 1760-63 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-505 (1994)).
240. Id., 103 Stat. at 1761 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 504(a) (1994)).
241. Id.
242. See 5 C.F.R. § 2636.104(b) (1995) (discussing possibility of disciplinary action).
243. Id.
244. 427 U.S. 123 (1976).
245. United States v. Hopkins, 427 U.S. 123, 124 (1976).
246. Id. at 128.
247. Id.
248. 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969).
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tied employee alleged that he had not received a promotion in eleven
years of service due to discrimination based on his national ori-
gin.249 The Eighth Circuit conceded that the plaintiff, as a public
employee, was "entitled to a distinct measure of due process with
respect to his employment."' The court, however, quoted com-
mentary by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, to wit: "Do we want courts
inquiring into personnel management-salary increases, sick leave,
office hours, allocation of parking spaces in the basement of the
agency's building?""' When the case involves issues of constitu-
tional proportion, such as First Amendment issues, however, courts
are more willing to step into the fray."
III. REGULATING FIRST AMENDMENT SPEECH BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
In NTEU, the Supreme Court recognized the heavy burden of
justification placed on public employers in two distinct circumstances:
(1) when the Government attempts to restrain employee speech
before it has occurred, and (2) when the Government acts to
discipline an employee who has engaged in speech-related conduct
that the Government believes has impaired its public mission.253
The Court has stated that a heavier burden on the Government is
justified when the Government attempts to regulate public employee
speech before or after it occurs, as opposed to when the Government
acts to discipline an employee for routine misconduct.' Thus, it
is appropriate to review the Court's pronouncements in both the ex
ante circumstance, where speech has yet to occur, and the ex post
circumstance, where discipline is taken against an employee who has
engaged in what arguably may be constitutionally protected
speech.255
A. Regulating Ex Ante Speech
Courts are willing to intervene more readily in ex ante circumstances
than in cases where an individual employee has been disciplined ex
249. Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1271 (8th Cir. 1969).
250. IkL at 1275.
251. 1& at 1276 (quoting 4 K DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16, at 82 (1958)).
252. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (stating that "[w]hen employee
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their
offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment").
253. United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1013 (1995).
254. I&; see also infra Part IIIA.S (discussing Sanjour v. Environmental Protection Agency,
56 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
255. IdL; see also supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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post because of the fundamental constitutional interests involved in
regulating conduct before it occurs. 56 The Supreme Court has
recognized that even though federal employees work for the federal
sovereign, they have not given up rights they "otherwise enjoy as
citizens to comment on matters of public interest." 7 The Court
has long held the view that more serious concerns are raised where
the Federal Government attempts to subject public employees to "a
sweeping statutory impediment to speech,"' than where the Gov-
ernment is acting as an employer making supervisory decisions that
may implicate First Amendment concerns. 5 9
To buttress its position that the Court needs to scrutinize ex ante
attempts to regulate employee speech, the majority in NTEU looked
to several of its other decisions not involving employer-employee
issues, but rather decisions involving pure First Amendment consider-
ations .2' For example, the majority opinion considered the wide-
spread impact of the honoraria ban that Congress had imposed as
having "far more serious concerns than could any single supervisory
decision."261  To support this proposition, the Court cited City of
Ladue v. Gilleo,262 in which the Court overturned a city ordinance
that prohibited a local resident from displaying a homemade sign in
the window of her home.2' The city's ordinance prohibited all
signs on private residences except "for sale" signs, signs warning about
safety dangers, and street address signs.26 The Court in Ladue was
concerned because the city ordinance foreclosed an entire medium
of public expression.2
In addition to concern over the widespread impact an all-encom-
passing honoraria ban has on public employee speech, the Court was
also troubled by the chilling effect on employees of barring speech
before it occurs.2  When discussing this matter, the Court in NTEU
made use of a 1931 Supreme Court decision, Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson.26 7 In Near, local county officials in Minneapolis used a state
256. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1013.
257. Id. at 1012 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
258. Id. at 1013.
259. Id. at 1014.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
263. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038,2046 (1994) (overturning city's refusal to allow
resident to hang sign stating "For Peace in the Gulf").
264. Id. at 2040.
265. Id. at 2045.
266. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1014.
267. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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law permitting permanent abatement as a public nuisance (in essence,
authorizing an injunction to abate the nuisance) of newspapers,
magazines, and other periodicals that published "malicious, scandal-
ous and defamatory" information.21 The newspaper in question
had published articles critical of local city and county officials,
accusing the officials of corruption and of affiliation with gang-
sters.2  The Court held that the state law was unconstitutional as
a prior restraint on free press and an infringement on liberty of the
press.2"° Equating the infringement of speech on federal employees
due to the honoraria ban with a local government's attempt to
regulate the speech of its private citizens in a First Amendment ex ante
context, the Court stated that the Government's burden was greater
with respect to the honoraria ban than "with respect to an isolated
disciplinary action." "'
The Court in NTEU also noted that in most circumstances it will
grant a stronger presumption of validity to Congress' legislative
pronouncements than to an individual employer's disciplinary
actions.2 1 The Court, however, had previously indicated that there
are circumstances when that might not be the case. In Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,273 Justice Steven's concurring opin-
ion stated that measures mandated by Congress "that have only
incidental effects on speech merit greater deference than those
supporting content-based restrictions on speech."274 The Court in
NTEU highlighted this proposition.2Y Thus, if the Court determines
that a particular congressional mandate has a direct impact on First
Amendment rights, the greater deference typically afforded to
Congress will not lie. In his dissent, ChiefJustice Rehnquist seemed
convinced that the majority in NTEU had established a new standard
under which the Court is to review a state's regulation of content-
based speech: the regulation must be necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and must be narrowly drawn to accomplish that end. 6
ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that this new standard, adopted by the
majority in NTEU, is a departure from the standard a plurality of the
Court announced in Waters-that the "government's interest in
268. Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 702-03 (1931).
269. Id. at 703-04.
270. Id at 723.
271. INTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1014.
272. Id.
273. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
274. Turner Broadcast Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2473 n.2 (Stevens,J, concurring).
275. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1014.
276. Id. at 1025 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated
from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a
significant one when it acts as employer."
2 7
1. Court sanctioned ex ante regulation of employee conduct
On two occasions the Court has rebuffed attempts by public
employees, and the unions representing them, to have ex ante rules
declared unconstitutional as infringing on their First Amendment
rights.278 More recently, in a third decision, the Court agreed with
the employees and the unions.279
In United Public Workers v. Mitchel42 ° several executive branch
employees along with the United Public Workers, a public employee
union, sought to enjoin the Civil Service Commission from enforcing
the Hatch Act provision that forbade employees from participating in
political campaigns, and asked for a declaratory judgment that the
Hatch Act was unconstitutional."' The appellants wanted to engage
in various political activities that were proscribed either by the Hatch
Act or the implementing Civil Service regulations, including letter
writing, poll watching, canvassing for signatures, and serving as
political committee members.8 2 Only one employee admitted to
engaging in such acts, and consequently, the Government notified the
employee that it intended to remove him from federal service.2' 3
The district court held that even though all the appellants had
standing to sue, the Hatch Act was valid and dismissed their claims for
failure to state a cause of action. 2 4 The Supreme Court disagreed
with the district court's ruling that all the appellants had standing and
held that an actual interference with their legal rights was required,
not merely a hypothetical threat.2"s The Court therefore found that
only one employee, Mr. Poole, who had actually violated the Hatch
Act and whose removal was pending, could maintain the action. 8
277. it. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
278. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90-98 (1947) (stating that Congress
may regulate political conduct of employees within reasonable limits and deferring judgment
on specific provisions of Hatch Act because plaintiffs did not allege violations of Hatch Act);
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556-57
(1973) (agreeing with Mitchell and holding constitutional bans on federal employees'
involvement in partisan political activity).
279. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1003.
280. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
281. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 82 (1947).
282. Id at 80-82.
283. 1& at 81, 91-92.
284. 1& at 84.
285. 1& at 89-90.
286. 1l at 91.
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The Supreme Court stated that the Hatch Act interfered with
otherwise constitutionally protected rights s.2 ' The Court, however,
noted that in forming our government, the states and the people had
granted certain authority to the Federal Government.2s The Court
stated that if the authority to enact the Hatch Act fell within that
power granted to Congress by the states and the people, then the
Court was required to balance the extent of the constitutional
guarantee of freedom against "a congressional enactment to protect
a democratic society against the supposed evil of political partisanship
by classified employees of government."
219
Weighing these factors, the Court found that valid historical
experience led Congress to enact the Hatch Act and its predecessor
statutory restrictions (the Pendleton Act and the LLoyd-LaFollette
Act) regarding public employee political involvement.21° The Court
stated that the restrictions were limited-that is, they did not intrude
on the right to vote, but only restricted partisan activity that had a
potentially adverse effect on government efficiency.29' The Court
also noted that Congress could reasonably conclude that limiting
partisan activity of federal employees would avoid a tendency toward
a one-party system 292 and would deter the ability of political leaders
to build a political machine.293 The Court was not swayed by the
argument that Congress should have narrowed the Hatch Act to
impose restrictions only on those federal workers who had contact
with the general public, 294 or on administrative employees, but not
industrial workers. 95 The Court concluded:
Courts will interfere only when such regulation passes beyond the
generally existing conception of governmental power. That concep-
tion develops from practice, history, and changing educational,
social and economic conditions .... Congress and the administra-
tive agencies have authority over the discipline and efficiency of the
public service. When actions of civil servants in the judgment of
Congress menace the integrity and the competency of the service,
287. d. at 94-95.
288. 1&. at 95-96.
289. Id. at 96.
290. Id. at 96-99 (noting that partisan activity by federal personnel threatens good
administration and efficiency).
291. Id. at 99-100.
292. Id. at 100.
293. Id. at 101.
294. I. (stating that Congress feared cumulative impact on employee morale of political
activity by all employees).
295. Id, at 102 (noting that distinction between administrative and industrial employees is
mere detail due to Congress' determination that partisan activity by any federal worker is
detrimental to government).
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legislation to forestall such danger and adequate to maintain its
usefulness is required. '
Accordingly, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch
Act. 2 97
Twenty-six years later, the Mitchell holding was "unhesitatingly"
reaffirmed29 when another group of employees and another union,
the National Association of Letter Carriers, sought an injunction
against enforcement of the Hatch Act, again attacking the constitu-
tionality of the provision prohibiting active involvement in political
299activities.
The constitutionality of the prohibition was again presented to the
Court after a three-judge panel found the definition of "political
activity" to be both vague and overbroad and enjoined its enforce-
mentY° The district court also found that the Mitchell decision had
been "so eroded" by subsequent decisions that it could no longer be
considered binding."' Interestingly, the Court in United States Civil
Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carrier 1 2 could have
followed the same approach as in Mitchell by declining to rule because
none of the appellants, who were government employees, had yet
violated the Hatch Act for fear of sanctions.3 Instead, the Court
used Letter Carriers to reaffirm the Mitchell holding," in light of its
interceding decision in Pickering v. Board of Education.5
In Pickering, the Court explained that the Government's interest in
regulating the speech of its employees was significantly different than
that of regulating the speech of society in general.3  The case
involved a high school teacher who wrote a letter to the editor of a
local newspaper criticizing the allocation of school funds from tax
revenues, and who was disciplined by school officials after the letter
was published."0 7 The difficulty was to strike a "'balance between
the interests of the (employee), as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the (government), as an
296. I& at 102-03 (emphasis added).
297. Id. at 103-04.
298. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,556
(1973).
299. 1& at 551.
300. Id. at 553.
301. 1&L at 553-54.
302. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
303. United States Civil Se,. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,551-
53 (1973).
304. I at 564.
305. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
306. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
307. 1l at 563.
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employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees.'" 30
8
The Court in Letter Carriers recognized four important governmen-
tal interests that Congress sought to protect by enacting the Hatch
Act."°  The first was the Government's interest in the impartial
execution of laws;310 the second was to prevent an erosion of public
confidence by having public employees avoid the appearance of
"practicing political justice;"3 ' the third was to avoid the creation
of a corrupt political machine involving public employees; 31 2 and
the fourth was the desire to protect employees from political pres-
sures." 3 The Court recognized that Congress could, in the future,
change its view on these matters, but that the Court was in no
position to dispute the approach Congress had taken, nor could it
find anything in the Constitution to forbid Congress' approach. 14
The Court then reviewed both the statute and the regulations
issued by the Civil Service Commission to implement the Hatch Act
and found that neither was vague nor overbroad."' The Court
noted that the regulations were explicit,"6 that the statutory provi-
sions were limited to and based on the former rule of the Civil Service
Commission," and that, although they were brief, they were "set
out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common
sense [could] sufficiently understand and comply with, without
sacrifice to the public interest."31
8
A final and fundamentally important due process aspect, recog-
nized by the Court in both Mitchell and Letter Carriers, is that violation
of government ex ante prohibitions most certainly could form the basis
for an ex post sanction against a federal employee."' Thus, in
Mitchell, the Court stated that the heart of the issue, and the only one
it was deciding, was "whether such a breach of the Hatch Act... can,
without violating the Constitution, be made the basis for disciplinary
"320action.
308. Letter Canirs, 413 U.S. at 564 (quoting Picketing, 391 U.S. at 568).
309. Id at 565-66.
310. I& at 564-65.
311. Id. at 565.
312. I&
313. I at 565-66.
314. I at 567.
315. l& at 568-81.
316. IL at 575.
317. I& at 576.
318. I& at 579.
319. 1& at 555-56.
320. Id. at 555 (quoting United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94 (1974)).
2273
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSTY LAw REVIEw [Vol. 44:2231
2. United States v. NTEU: the Supreme Court finds one form of ex
ante regulation unconstitutional
Whether the honoraria ban found in Title VI of the Ethics Reform
Act of 198921 could also form the basis for disciplinary action
against an employee was an implicit issue for the Court in its NTEU
decision."z The Court in NTEU pointed out that in Pickering and
several other cases, the Court had recognized that Congress could
impose restrictions on job-related speech of public employees
although such restrictions would be constitutionally impermissible if
applied to the public at large."z The Court noted that such cases
typically involved disciplinary actions taken in response to employee
speech. 24 The Court went on to state that in Letter Carriers it had
established that the Government must be able to satisfy the Pickering
balancing test in order to maintain a statutory restriction on employee
speech,"z but that the Court had never determined how the compo-
nents of a Pickering balancing test should be analyzed in the context
of a sweeping statutory impediment to employee speech. 26
The Court was convinced that the Government, as an employer,
should have a greater burden to bear when justifying adverse
employee action with respect to the honoraria ban, than with respect
to some other form of isolated disciplinary action.3" This is be-
cause the honoraria ban has such a widespread impact and it restricts
speech before it occurs. 2
Like Mitchell and Letter Carriers, NTEUinvolved a challenge brought
by several federal employees and two federal sector unions."s The
federal employees challenged the constitutionality of certain provi-
sions of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989"s that imposed limitations
on outside employment for members of Congress and certain senior
321. Pub. L No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1760-63 (1989) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 501 (1994)).
322. United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995).
323. Id. at 1012.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1013.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1010. The district court certified the NTEU as the class representative for all
executive branch employees below Grade GS-16 who would receive honoraria but for the
statutorily imposed ban. NTEU v. United States, 788 F. Supp. 4, 5-7 (D.D.C. 1992).
330. Pub. L No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-505
(1994)).
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level employees and eliminated receipt of honoraria for all federal
employees and members of Congress.331
In particular, the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 implemented a cap on
the outside income that could be earned annually by members of
Congress and, non-career civil servants above the grade of GS-16.32
In addition, the Ethics Reform Act also imposed a prohibition on all
individuals, whether they were an employee, an officer, or a member
of Congress, from receiving honoraria, as defined in the statute.' 3
Originally, the statute defined an honorarium as a "payment of money
or other thing of value for an appearance, speech or article. " "S
The definition was amended in 1991 to exclude any series of
appearances, speeches, or articles unrelated to the individual's official
duties or status.3
In addition to the intrusion on their ability to engage in certain
outside activities and their ability to receive compensation for such
activities, the federal employees also had to contend with potential
sanctions. The Ethics Reform Act authorized the Attorney General
to initiate a civil action in the appropriate district court against any
individual thought to be in violation of the statute, in which the court
could assess a civil penalty of up to $10,000, or the amount of the
compensation the individual received, whichever was greater."s In
addition to the possibility of a civil penalty, federal employees faced
potential disciplinary action, including removal from federal ser-
vice.337
These restrictions and corresponding sanctions combined to lead
the federal employees to move for summary judgment, arguing that
the honoraria ban was unconstitutional and to seek an injunction
against government enforcement of the statuteSas The district court
granted the motion for summary judgment and found the statute
unconstitutional, enjoining the Government from enforcing it against
any executive branch personnel.3 9 Not only did the district court
331. Id., 103 Stat. at 1760-63 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 501 (1994)) (amending Title V of
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 92-521, 92 Stat. 1864-67 (1978)).
332. 1& (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(a) (1994)). The cap on outside earned income is
15% of annual basic rate of pay. Id.
333. Id. (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 501(b) (1994)).
334. I., 103 Stat. at 1762 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 505(3) (1994)).
335. Congressional OperationsAppropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-90, § 314(b), 105
Stat. 450 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. § 505(3) (1994)).
336. Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1760, 1761 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. § 504(a) (1994)).
337. 5 C.F.R. § 2636.104(b) (1995).
338. NTEU v. United States, 788 F. Supp. 4,5 (D.D.C. 1992), af'd, 990 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.
1993), modifwd, 115 S. Ct. 1536 (1995).
339. Id. at 13.
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find the statute underinclusive because it prohibited some forms of
speech but not others, but also it found the statute overinclusive
because it restricted too much speech of public employees."0 The
court of appeals affirmed."~' The court of appeals was concerned
that the Government did not establish a connection between any
actual or apparent improprieties that were supposed to have occurred
with government employment1 2 Given the sweeping nature of the
prohibitions, the court did not consider that the Government had
met its burden ofjustifying the need for government employees to be
singled out specifically"4 3 Agreeing with the district court that the
statute was unconstitutional, the court of appeals included in those
entitled to relief all members of the Senior Executive Service, a class
of senior level executive branch employees who had not previously
been parties to the litigation.' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.'
The Supreme Court noted that the case was unique because it did
not involve "a post hoc analysis of one employee's speech and its
impact on that employee's public responsibilities,"4 ' but rather
involved "a sweeping statutory impediment to speech." 7 Of equal
importance to the Court was the fact that the broad prohibition on
the acceptance of honoraria struck all federal employees, high
ranking and low ranking alike, posing a far more significant burden
on them than on "the relatively small group of lawmakers whose past
receipt of honoraria motivated its enactment." 348 The Court ex-
pressed concern that denying honoraria to such lower-ranking
employees would not only diminish their expressive output but
deprive the general public of the benefit of what these individuals
might otherwise have written and said. 49 Noting that certain great
novelists and poets had been Customs Service employees,50 the
340. d. at 9.
341. NTEU v. United States, 990 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff'g 788 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C.
1992).
342. IM. at 1276.
343. Id. at 1277.
344. Id. at 1278.
345. 114 S. Ct. 1539 (1994).
346. United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct 1003, 1013 (1995).
347. Id.
348. Id. at 1014.
349. Id. at 1014-15. The Court also noted that although the honoraria ban did not prohibit
any speech outright or discriminate among speakers based on their viewpoint or the content of
their messages, it did impose a significant burden on expressive activity because of its
prohibition on compensation. Id. This burden had greater impact on low-ranking federal
employees than on high ranking government officials and members of Congress. Id.
350. Id. at 1012.
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Court commented that the honoraria ban might deprive the country
of future great novelists and poets. 51
The Government contended that the honoraria ban did not run
afoul of the First Amendment because Congress had reacted
reasonably in deciding that it would interfere with the efficiency of
the federal service to permit federal employees to receive honorar-
ia.352 To support their arguments, the Government cited the
Court's 1947 Mitchell decision involving the Hatch Act.353  The
Court, however, looked to circumstances underlying its ruling
validating the constitutionality of the Hatch Act, noting both the
specific policy concerns Congress identified and the fact that the
Hatch Act was meant more to protect employees from partisan
political activity rather than restrict them from engaging in it.'M It
was significant to the Court that while the governmental interest in
insuring that federal officials not misuse power by accepting compen-
sation for unofficial writings "is undeniably powerful,"355 the Govern-
ment was unable to identify any specific instances of misconduct by
lower ranking employees.35 ' All that the Government could muster,
the Court stated, was limited evidence of impropriety of members of
Congress and high ranking government officials. 57
The Court rejected the Government's argument that a broad rule
was more readily enforceable and easier to administer than a narrowly
tailored rule that required individual nexus determinations .3 ' A
much stronger justification was required, the Court concluded, than
the Government's "dubious claim of administrative convenience."3
59
The Court also accused Congress of ignoring the recommendations
of two Presidential Commissions for a definition of honoraria that
would close specific loopholes.3s  Instead of acting on the
Commissions' suggestions to narrow the restrictions, the Court noted
that Congress opted to impose broad restrictions on speech-related
activities.3 61  On the other hand, the Court mentioned that the
351. I& at 1015. The Court pointed out that the regulations, as drafted by the Office of
Government Ethics, would not have prohibited Melville and Hawthorne from writing because
of the exclusion for poetry and fiction. Id. at 1015 n.16. The Court also pointed out that great
artists often write non-fiction as well as fiction and poetry. I&
352. Id at 1015.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1016.
356. Id.
357. IX.
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Office of Government Ethics had issued regulations specifically
exempting many types of performances and writings that would likely
have fallen within the statutory terms "appearance, speech or
article." 62 To the Court, this further undercut the Government's
argument that the efficiency of the federal service was impaired by
allowing low level federal employees to receive honoraria for activities
not connected with their jobs.s3
The Court turned to a 1994 decision to reemphasize the impor-
tance of the burden placed on the Government when the Govern-
ment creates a limitation on free speech using past harms or possible
future harms as a justification. Turner Broadcasting System v. FCc564
was a reaction by the cable industry to legislation passed by Congress
when several television networks claimed that the cable industry was
jeopardizing the operating ability of the networks."6  To counter
concerns raised by the networks, Congress had passed legislation
requiring cable television operators to carry a certain number of local
commercial and public television stations."6 In Turner, cable oper-
ators attacked the constitutionality of the must-carry provisions. 67
The Court recognized the validity of the governmental interest in
preserving local broadcasting, but remanded the case for further
proof that the regulations would, in fact, achieve the desired goal."~
The Court stated:
When the Government defends a regulation on speech as a means
to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do
more than simply "posit the existence of the disease sought to be
cured."... It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate
these harms in a direct and material way.'
The Court in NTEU applied the logic of its pronouncement in
Turner to the Government's attempt to ban its employees from
accepting honoraria.370 Considering its decisions in Pickerin3 71
362. Id. at 1018.
363. It
364. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
365. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
366. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L No. 102-
385, §§ 4, 5, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471-81 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (Supp. V 1993)).
367. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2461 (discussing appellant's argument that
regulations are content-based).
368. Id. at 2469-72.
369. It. at 2470.
370. See United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1017 (1995) (comparing NTEU's situation
with situation in Turner).
371. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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and Waters,172 the Court concluded that because the "vast majority"
of the prohibited speech did not involve government employment
and would take place outside the workplace, the Government was
unable to justify the honoraria ban on the basis of immediate
workplace disruption."73
The Court thus affirmed the injunction against enforcement of the
honoraria ban insofar as the original parties to the litigation were
concerned, but it reversed the relief granted by the court of appeals
to members of the Senior Executive Service who were not original
parties to the lawsuit. 74 The Court's decision does not immediately
end the issue. The Office of Government Ethics has announced that
although the Court overturned the honoraria ban in the statute,
employees remain covered by an honoraria ban contained in an
Executive Order that was not at issue in the lawsuit.75 The ban is
contained in an Executive Order entitled "Principles of Ethical
Conduct for Government Officers and Employees."37
The dissent in NTEU was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, with
whom Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.377 ChiefJustice Rehnquist
believed that the majority had understated the importance of the
justification for the ban asserted by the Government and had focused
on a handful of individual situations to justify its sweeping rejection
of the statute.378 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the majority
had taken a statute that made no attempt to regulate either content
or viewpoint and had imposed a standard of review on it that the
Court had established only for laws impinging on content-based
expression.3 9 The majority required that the regulation be neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly drawn to
372. 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
373. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1013.
374. IdL at 1018-19.
375. Memorandum from Stephen D. Potts, Director, United States Office of Government
Ethics, to DesignatedAgency Officials, Honoraria (DO-95-011) (Mar. 3,1995) [hereinafter Office
of Government Ethics Memorandum: Honoraria]; see also Christy Harris, Work-Related Freelance
Ban Hols FED. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at 6 (discussing Office of Government Ethics' response
to Court's decision).
376. Exec. Order No. 12,731, § 101, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1991) (amending Exec. OrderNo. 12,674,
3 C.F.R. 215 (1990)), reprinted, as amended, in 5 U.S.CA § 7301 (1994). Specifically, § 101(d)
prohibits receipt by employees of gifts or other items of monetary value from those doing
business with the Government, regulated by the employee's agency or whose interests may be
substantially affected by the employee's performance of duties. Also, § 101(j) prohibits
employees from engaging in outside employment or activities that conflict with their official
government duties or obligations. Ild.
377. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1024-31 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
378. Ld. at 1024 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
379. lId at 1025 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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achieve that end.' The dissent, however, felt that the proper
standard had been addressed by the Court in Waters."sI The dissent
agreed that the Government's interest in regulating speech is.
subordinate to an individual's right of expression, except when the
individual is also a government employee, in which case what is a
subordinate interest when the individual is not a government
employee is elevated to a significant interest.s2 Chief Justice
Rehnquist felt that substantial weight should have been given to the
Government's predictions of harm, which the majority had discount-
ed.-a8
Chief Justice Rehnquist challenged the majority for focusing on
several isolated examples of the impact on employees and using these
limited situations to abolish the entire honoraria ban.'1  The
dissent disagreed with the majority's view that federal employees
below GS-16 would have negligible impact to confer favors. U 5
Rather, the dissent argued that any category of federal employee
below Grade GS-16, including tax examiners, bank examiners, and
enforcement officials, could have substantial power to confer
favors. 6 The dissent was also concerned that the majority ignored
the fact that Congress had enacted a broad prophylactic rule in the
Ethics Reform Act and jettisoned as inadequate the former system
which required case-by-case determinations. These former case-by-
case determinations required agency ethics officials to look at a
particular fact situation and determine whether it did or did not
constitute an ethical violation or a standard of conduct problemA7
ChiefJustice Rehnquist found it ironic that the majority was requiring
Congress to "resurrect a bureaucracy that it previously felt compelled
380. Id (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
381. See id4 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct 1878, 1887
(1994)).
382. Waters, 114 S. Ct at 1887.
383. See NTEU, 115 S. Ct at 1027 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (discussing Government's
interest in preventing impropriety and appearance of impropriety).
384. Id. at 1027 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
385. Id at 1028-29 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). There is no longer a "Grade GS-16,"
although it was discussed in the Court's decision. Positions that were formerly classified as
Grade 16 and above were done away with in 1990 in the Federal Employees Pay Comparability
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-509, 104 Stat. 1423 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5307 (1994)).
How to handle Court's references to positions Grade 16 and below was of concern to the Office
of Government Ethics (OGE), which advised agency ethics officials in a March 3, 1995,
memorandum that it was discussing the matter with the Department ofJustice. See Office of
Government Ethics Memorandum, Honorafia, supra note 375.
386. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1028 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
387. Id at 1030 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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to replace and to equip it with resources sufficient to conduct case-by-
case determinations."M
Justice O'Connor, while filing a separate concurrence in the
judgment, also dissented in part s9 Justice O'Connor adhered to
the efficacy of the Court's Pickring test, which balances the interests
of the employee as a citizen against the interests of the Government
as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services the
Government performs through its employees." ° Justice O'Connor
did not agree with the majority's reliance on a "meaningful distinc-
tion" between "ex ante" speech and "ex post" punishments.39' Rather,
she preferred a case-by-case analysis approach.392 Justice O'Connor
stated: "To draw the line based on a distinction between ex ante
rules and ex post punishments, in my view, overgeneralizes and
threatens undue interference with 'the government's mission as
employer.'" 39 3  Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment,
however, because application of the Picketing balancing test favored
the employees.3 4 She acknowledged that although ordinarily great
deference is given to Government predictions of harm used to justify
restrictions on public speech, she believed that as the magnitude of
the intrusion increased, so too did the burden on the Government to
justify the necessity of the intrusion.395 According to Justice
O'Connor, the Government had failed to marshall sufficient proof
that the intrusion, namely the honoraia ban, was necessary.3"
Moreover, certain loopholes Congress had created for a series of
speeches or publications substantially weakened its arguments. 39
Justice O'Connor dissented, however, with regard to the remedy
espoused by the majority. She emphasized that the majority's remedy,
overturning the honoraria ban as it related to all speech, should have
been restricted solely to speech that bore no relationship to the
individual's federal employment. 9
388. Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
389. aL at 1019-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment, dissenting in part).
390. l at 1020 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment, dissenting in part) (quoting
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
391. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
392. i (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
393. I. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (quoting Waters v. Churchill,
114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994)).
394. I. at 1020-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
395. I. at 1021 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
396. I. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
397. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
398. I. at 1022-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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3. Sanjour v. Environmental Protection Agency: first application of
the NTEU standard
Appropriately, the first case which construed an ex ante challenge
to the Government's attempt to regulate employee speech arose in
the same court in which NTEUarose, and arose in the context of the
honoraria ban. In Sanjour v. Environmental Protection Agency,"' the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (which had
decided NTEU en route to the Court) applied the Court's teachings
in NTEU to the question of governmental attempts to regulate
employee speech that directly relates to employee's governmental job.
Conversely, NTEU addressed Government attempts to regulate
employee off-duty speech unrelated to a government position.
The D.C. Circuit granted a request for en banc review of its earlier
decision upholding the Government's restriction on acceptance of
honoraria connected with an employee's official position, but
withheld its disposition of the case pending the Court's issuance of its
opinion in NTEU.' ° Based on NTEU, the court reversed its earlier
decision."°
a. Crafting the "Pickering/NTEU "standard
Sanjour involved two EPA employees who had been invited in 1991
by a North Carolina group known as "NC WARN" to come to North
Carolina and talk at a public hearing about concerns over planned
construction of a hazardous waste incinerator. °2 Both employees
had subject matter expertise on this topic and had criticized EPA
hazardous waste policies in the past.4 ° The combined effect of
regulations and policies promulgated by the Office of Government
Ethics, the General Services Administration, and the EPA itself
required that before the employees could be reimbursed for travel to
North Carolina they had to obtain prior approval from EPA offi-
cials.' As a result, both employees turned down the offer and NC
WARN subsequently canceled the public hearing.
05
399. 56 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
400. Sanjour v. Environmental Protection Agency, 56 F.3d 85, 90 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
401. It. at 99. The case had a long procedural history. See Sanjour v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 984 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1993), aff'g 786 F. Supp. 1033 (D.D.C. 1992).
402. Sanjour, 56 F.3d at 89.
403. Id. (explaining that employees had given speeches critical of EPA policies in unofficial
capacity for more than decade).
404. Id. 88-89.
405. Id. at 89.
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In October 1991, the employees instituted suit in district court,
alleging both constitutional (First Amendment) and statutory viola-
tions.' The district court granted summary judgment on all
grounds except one that alleged a selective prosecution claim, and the
employees appealed.'
The D.C. Circuit agreed that the Pickering balancing test applied.
That is, the court must "arrive at a balance between the interests of
the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employ-
ees."40
At issue here, however, was not the test to be applied, the court of
appeals noted, but rather the manner of its application. The facts in
Picketing and most of its progeny dealt with after-the-fact circumstanc-
es involving discipline of a single employee who raised the First
Amendment as an affirmative defense to the action being taken by
the government actor. In Sanjour, however, government regulations
operated to prohibit or substantially restrict "a broad category of
[prospective] speech by a large number of potential speakers."'
Fortunately, the court noted that the NTEUdecision offered "useful
guidance" on applying Pickering to a case involving prospective
speech.410 The court concluded that a statute or a government
regulation infringing on speech that acts as a wholesale deterrent to
a broad category of expression, gives rise to far more serious concerns
than any single supervisory decision, such as an ex post supervisory
decision as in Pickering.4l
The Pickering/NTEU test applied in Sanjour is: "The government
must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast
group of present and future employees in a broad range of present
and future expression are outweighed by that expression's 'necessary
impact on the actual operation' of the government."4 2
b. Applying the Pickering/NTEU standard in Sanj our
Weighing the interest of the government employees and the public
against the Government's interest, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
406. Id.
407. Id. 89-90.
408. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
409. Sanjour, 56 F.3d at 91.
410. ML
411. Id. (citing United States v. NTEU, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1014 (1995)).
412. IR. (citing NTEU, 115 S. Ct. at 1014 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571)).
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balance weighed in favor of employee free speech rights and against
the Government's regulations.413
The court recognized the government employees' interest in being
reimbursed for travel expenses necessary for teaching, speaking or
writing relating to their official duties.414 The court rejected the
Government's argument that its regulations did not ban speech
outright, but simply removed an incentive, thus constituting only a
moderate burden.415 Citing NTEU, the court concluded that this
was a substantial burden on employees, and, in fact, acted as a greater
impediment than the ban struck down in NTEU.416 The court was
swayed also by the interest of unknown present and future govern-
ment employees and audiences in delivering or receiving speech that
otherwise would be suppressed.1
Against this balance, the Government weighed in with two argu-
ments. Initially the Government argued that the regulations attempt-
ed to avoid the appearance of impropriety, and this justified a
requirement that employees could accept travel expense reimburse-
ment only for appearances that had been pre-approved. 4 s The
court countered that the harm which the Government sought to
address bore no relation to the distinction between "official" and
"unofficial" employee speech, but instead derived from the interest a
private source, might have in attempting to exert influence over the
actions of an employee.1 9 Viewed from this perspective, the court
noted that the appearance of impropriety would be the same
regardless of whether the Government approved or disapproved, and
in fact may be exacerbated if the Government put its stamp of
approval on a speech when in fact there was an attempt by a private
source to influence a government employee.420 The court noted
that the Government dropped this approach at oral argument.42 '
The second relevant governmental interest identified by the court
was preventing government employees from using their public office
for private gain, in essence an argument that permitting employees to
receive reimbursement for expenses related to their official duties
would amount to allowing them to be compensated twice for the same
413. lML at 93-99.
414. I& at 93.
415. Id.
416. Id at 93-94.
417. Id. at 94.
418. I1&
419. Id.
420. Id. at 94-95.
421. Id. at 94.
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work.422 The court answered that the government regulations under
review were both too underinclusive and overinclusive to accomplish
the goals sought."z
The court stated that the underinclusiveness of the regulations was
their "most troubling feature" because the regulations required only
advance official approval but did not regulate the official appearances
themselves.424 Similarly, the court found that the regulations were
overbroad because they were not narrowly tailored to address the
harm that the Government purportedly sought to protect against."
According to the court, the Government had failed to adequately
articulate the genuine harms that the regulations were meant to
correCt.
4 26
The court expressed grave additional concerns that the practical
effect of the regulations would be to stifle anti-government speech,
particularly since the applicable regulations permitted official approval
only for speech that was "within the mission of the agency."427 It
was the unfettered discretion that the Government enjoyed in
approving or disapproving speech that led the court to conclude that
the regulations were impermissible and justified "an additional thumb
on the employees' side of our scales."428
The dissent noted that the result reached by the majority was driven
by how the majority characterized the issues involved and that, had
they been characterized differently, under a Pickering balance, the
regulations would have withstood scrutiny.4' The dissent argued
that the majority divided up all the factors involved in the case and
wound up overlooking the agency's objective as part of the "big pic-
ture."4 °
Now that the D.C. Circuit has provided a Pickeing/N TEU standard
for ex ante speech, considerations in ex post employee speech situa-
422. Id. at 94-95.
423. Id. at 95-98.
424. Id. at 95.
425. Id. at 97.
426. Id. at 98.
427. Id. at 96.
428. Id. at 97.
429. Id. at 99-100 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
430. I1. at 101-02 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Judge Sentelle is not alone in his dissent. The
Office of Government Ethics has taken the position that Sanjour is wrongly decided, but that it
did not have the authority to seek furtherjudicial review. Memorandum from Stephen D. Potts,
Director, United States Office of Government Ethics, to Designated Agency Ethics Officials,
Sanjour v. Environmental Protection Agency (DO-95-026) (June 26, 1995). OGE advised federal
agency ethics officials that the Department of'Justice took the position that because the case was
not a class action, it granted relief only to the two named plaintiffs, and the honoraria ban
remained in effect for all other federal employees. Id.
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tions-where the Government, as employer, seeks to impose sanctions
on an employee and the employee asserts the First Amendment as a
defense to the government action-still remains.
B. Ex Post Sanctions Against Public Employees
Whether the Court carves out new law in future cases, further
distinguishing ex ante and ex post prohibitions, or whether Justice
O'Connor convinces her colleagues to adopt a Pickeingbalance using
a case-by-case approach, it is clear that whenever the Court does find
valid a government ex ante rule prohibiting conduct before it occurs,
and when a violation occurs, discipline against the offending
employee is a likely result.4" l Where the offending conduct involves
speech, however, the Government has another hurdle remaining.
Stated another way, the employee still has a shield. The issue then
becomes whether the offending speech is protected under the First
Amendment.
1. Protecting public employee speech
a. Pickering v. Board of Education: purely public speech
In Pickering v. Board of Education,43 2 the Court confronted the
question of whether a well-meaning public employee, concerned over
how local tax revenues would be spent at the school where he taught,
could be disciplined by his employer, the local public high school.33
The offending high school teacher had written a letter to the editor
of the local newspaper criticizing the allocation of school funds.
4a4
The letter was critical of the division of revenues between the school's
educational and athletic programs, and also alleged that the local
school superintendent had pressured teachers not to oppose or
criticize a school bond issue that subsequently failed.41 The teacher
submitted the letter for publication after the bond issue had
failed.4"6  The Court confronted a "bright-line" situation-the
431. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-95 (1947) (holding that industrial
worker could be removed from office under Hatch Act for engaging in political activity).
432. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
433. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-75 (1968) (holding that teacher may
not be disciplined for making statements on issues of public importance absent proof that
statements were false, and were made knowingly or recklessly).
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comment was public and there was no dispute that it concerned a
matter of public concern.43 7
In Pickering, the Court struck a balance between a public employee's
interest in making public comment on matters of public concern and
a public employer's interest in promoting the efficiency of its public
services .4 It was clear to the Court that a public employer could
not constitutionally compel a public employee to relinquish his or her
First Amendment right to comment on matters of public concern
otherwise enjoyed by the employee.4 9  The Court, however, also
recognized that the state had an interest in regulating the conduct of
its employees in order to accomplish its public mission."0 The
quandary facing the Court was how to strike an appropriate bal-
ance.
4 41
One issue in Pickering was whether the teacher could be held
accountable for the correctness or accuracy of his public state-
ments."2 The school contended that the teacher had an obligation
of loyalty by virtue of his employment with the school to ensure that
any public comment was factually accurate. 3  It contended that
some of the teacher's statements were false and damaged the
reputations of the school board and the school superintendent'
The teacher, on the other hand, argued that the statements were not
defamatory unless they were made with the knowledge that they were
false or with reckless disregard for the accuracy of the statements.'
The Court unequivocally rejected any construction of the law that
would have allowed the school board to terminate the teacher based
on the level of criticism the teacher used in his letter.'4 The Court
also held that, absent proof of false statements knowingly and
recklessly made by the teacher, the teacher could not be dismissed by
the school board for exercising his right to speak on issues of public
437. IM. at 566-67. In Pickeing, the Court dealt with comments contained in a published
letter to the editor, while in Waters, comments were overheard in a cafeteria. In Pidreying, the
comments concerned how tax revenues would be spent for public education. In Water, the
"public concern" comments (quality of hospital care given) were intermingled with and virtually
indistinguishable from the employee's personal workplace complaints. In this sense, then,
Pikering provided a "bright-line" scenario which the Court did not have the luxury of in Watem




442. Id. at 568-69.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 570.
445. Id. at 569 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)).
446. d. at 570.
2287
THE AMERCAN UN ERSrIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:2231
importance. 7  The Court placed great weight on the public's
interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public
importance.448 Accordingly, the "core value"449 of the First
Amendment overrode the interest of the school in sanctioning the
employee.4W°
A final aspect of importance in Pickering was that the teacher did
not comment on matters regarding his own employment relationship
with his employer."1 The Court also noted that the teacher's
employment relationship with the school board and with the superin-
tendent was "not the kind of close working relationship for which it
can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are
necessary to their proper functioning. "452 Finally, there was the
source of the teacher's information. It did not come from internal
school documents, but to get the information he used, the teacher
borrowed copies of back issues from the local newspaper spanning a
ten-month period.45 3
b. Connick v. Myers: attributes of both public and private comment
The issue confronting the Court in Connick v. Myerd'4 was wheth-
er the employee's statements dealt with matters of public concern or
whether the statements were within the context of her employ-
ment.45 5  The case grew out of a dispute between an Assistant
District Attorney in New Orleans and her boss, the District Attor-
ney."6 When the District Attorney proposed to transfer the employ-
ee from one section to another within the office, she strongly
opposed. 7 In an effort to forestall the transfer, the employee
drafted a questionnaire." The questionnaire raised issues about
office morale, office transfer policy, need for a grievance committee,
and whether employees had been pressured to work in political
campaigns." Although she talked to'the Prosecuting Attorney the
next day and he encouraged her to accept the transfer, the employer
447. Id. at 574-75.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 573.
450. Id.
451. Id. at 569-70.
452. Id. at 570.
453. Id. at 575.
454. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
455. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-47 (1983).
456. Id. at 14042.
457. Id. at 140-41.
458. Id. at 141.
459. Id.
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did not mention the questionnaire." Instead, when he left the
office, she began distributing the questionnaire.46' After learning
she was circulating the questionnaire, another Assistant District
Attorney notified the District Attorney.462 The District Attorney
confronted her and advised her she was being terminated.4" The
employee sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that she was fired
in violation of her First Amendment rights." Both the district
court and the court of appeals held that the questionnaire involved
matters of public concern and that the state had not clearly demon-
strated that the questionnaire substantially interfered with the
operations of the District Attorney's office.'
The Supreme Court disagreed, however. It found that both the
district court and the court of appeals had erred in striking the
Picketing balance in favor of the employee.' The Court stated that
if the questionnaire did not fairly constitute speech on a matter of
public concern, then it was unnecessary to review the circumstances
of the employee's dismissal. 7 The Court found that the question
of whether employees in the District Attorney's office felt pressured
to take part in political campaigns potentially involved a matter of
"public concern."4" Considering the record in its entirety, the
Court ultimately held that this did not rise to the level of matters of
"public concern" entitled to constitutional protection.469
When discerning whether there is an element of public concern in
public employee speech, the Court advised that the content, form,
and text of the speech should be determined by a reviewing court
from the record as a whole.' ° Of particular importance to the
Court was the context in which the questionnaire was developed.47'
It was not, the Court said, developed out of academic interest, but
rather it arose from a dispute that had occurred in the workplace.'
The Court observed that "[w]hen employee speech concerning office





464. IdL at 141-42.
465. Myers v. Connick, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.), afl'g 507 F. Supp. 752, 759-60 (E.D. La.
1981), 7v'd, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
466. Camnhk, 461 U.S. at 142.
467. I& at 146.
468. d.
469. I. at 148.
470. I. at 147-48.
471. Id at 148.
472. It at 153.
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application of that policy to the speaker, additional weight must be
given to the supervisor's view that the employee has threatened the
authority of the employer to run the office."47
Under this framework, the Court ultimately held that when a public
employee speaks not as a citizen on matters of public concern, but as
an employee on matters of personal concern, federal courts are not
the appropriate forum for reviewing personnel decisions that result
from the employee's actions.474 The Court rejected what it per-
ceived in Connick as an attempt to "constitutionalize" the employee
grievance process. 475
2. Applying the Connick test in Waters v. Churchill
It is important at the outset to hone in on the nature of the speech
involved in Waters v. Churchill 476 and the context within which it
arose. The constitutional issues arose when a public hospital in
Illinois fired a nurse, Cheryl Churchill, for remarks she made to a co-
worker during a dinner conversation in the hospital cafeteria.477
The co-worker, another nurse, had expressed interest in transferring
to the obstetrics department where Churchill worked.7 Other
hospital employees overheard parts of the conversation.479 One
employee reported that Churchill had made negative comments about
Churchill's immediate supervisor, Cynthia Waters, a fact that was
subsequently verified by Churchill's dinner partner in a meeting with
Waters. 4 ° Reportedly, Churchill was unhappy over an evaluation
that Waters had given her and was disparaging of the obstetrics
department 481
Churchill's version of what occurred was different.482  When
interviewed by management, she acknowledged making certain
comments, but contended that her comments were not about matters
personal to her, but rather about matters involving the hospital's
"cross-training" policy that allowed nurses from one overstaffed
department to work in another understaffed department.48 3 Al-
though she acknowledged making comments about one of her
473. Md
474. 1& at 147.
475. I& at 154.
476. 114 S. C. 1878 (1994).
477. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1882 (1994).
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. IM. at 1882-83.
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supervisors, Churchill claimed that they concerned matters of staffing
policy that were impeding nursing care.' Recollections of two of
the co-workers who overheard the conversation tended to support
Churchill's version.'
Thus, it was unclear exactly what was said. According to the
hospital, Churchill's remarks were insubordinate, disparaging, and
disrespectful to her superiors, and could have had the effect of under-
mining supervisory authority. The hospital believed that Churchill's
remarks did not relate to matters of public concern and impaired its
ability to render services efficiently to the public. 4 6 According to
Churchill, however, her comments concerned matters of public
concern because they addressed the staffing policies of a public
hospital and matters that affected general health care at a public
facility. 7 The issue was whether the district court should "apply the
Connick test to the speech as the government employer found it to be,
or should [the court] ask the jury to determine the facts for it-
self?" 41
The district court held that Churchill's speech was not a matter of
public concern, and therefore was not protected. The court found
that even if Churchill's speech involved a matter of public concern,
the disruption it caused to the hospital was so great that the hospital
could fire Churchill with impunity.' The court of appeals dis-
agreed.4" Viewing Churchill's speech in the light most favorable to
her, it found that she had spoken on matters of public concern
relating to alleged violation of state nursing regulations and the
quality of care the public hospital provided patients.49'
It is important to recall that the Supreme Court in Waters did not
decide when speech by a government employee is protected by the
First Amendment; instead, the Court established the test to be applied
when determining whether speech was purely private or part public,
and who should apply the test-the employer, a reviewing court, or
a jury.492 The question before the Court was from whose perspec-
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Id. at 1883-84.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 1884.
489. Churchill v. Waters, 731 F. Supp. 311,318-22 (C.D. Il1. 1990), rev'd, 977 F.2d 1114 (7th
Cir. 1992).
490. Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1122-26 (7th Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded, 114
S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
491. Id. at 1122-23.
492. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1884 (1994).
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tive the facts should be viewed."' The Court asked whether the
Connick test should apply to the speech as understood by the
government employer, or whether the jury should assess the speech
for itself.4"
Justice Scalia diverged from the plurality in a separate concurring
opinion on this critical point.495 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
plurality, placed the burden on the public employer to conduct a
reasonable investigation beforehand to determine whether the
employee's speech met the Connick test and was entitled to First
Amendment protection.496 In Justice O'Connor's view, the jury or
the court would then have the opportunity to conduct a second
review to determine whether the public employer's investigation was
reasonable.497 She felt this would provide greater protection for the
employee.498 According to Justice O'Connor, the employee would
have "two opportunities to be vindicated."4"
Despite advocating this two-tiered approach, Justice O'Connor was
concerned that it would present a problem for management. She
noted that managers would be required to place themselves in the
shoes of the jury, trying to ferret out how ajury might construe what
had transpired rather than relying on what conclusions the manager,
as an experienced professional, would reach.5" After grappling with
this problem, however, she concluded that "employer decision making
will not be unduly burdened by having courts look to the facts as the
employer reasonably found them to be."5"' Justice O'Connor pointed
out that the Court had never specified the quantum of proof of
workplace disruption that would be required before a public employer
could take action against an employee, where the employee had
engaged in protected speech."2 She also noted that the Court had
never established a general test to determine when a procedural
safeguard, such as an investigation by the public employer, was
required by the First Amendment.5 '  Nor had the Court ever
attempted to identify specific types of public employee speech that
493. Md
494. RL
495. See id. at 1893-98 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
496. IL at 1889.
497. Id.
498. Id at 1885.
499. ML
500. Id. (mentioning concern that employer would have to consider evidentiary issues such
as hearsay and bias).
501. AL at 1889.
502. 1&
503. Md at 1889-93.
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were so lacking in value that they could not be accorded First Amend-
ment protection.5°  Noting that the Court did not "purport to do
so now,5 05 Justices O'Connor and Scalia agreed that the Constitu-
tion mandated some procedural protection. 0 6  In Justice
O'Connor's view, the crux of the issue was whether a bright line rule
could be established that would provide an answer for every case. °7
Justice O'Connor believed that lower courts must use a case-by-case
approach when subjecting a public employer to a "reasonableness"
standard for review of its disciplinary actions in employee protected
speech cases.5'0
Justice Scalia, however, criticized Justice O'Connor's approach as
placing a burden on management to not only investigate, but to
"investigate ... to determine whether... to investigate."509 Justice
Scalia felt that management should be entitled to rely on the facts as
it found them, and a reviewing court should be limited to inquiring
only about whether there might be some pretext involved in the
management's decision."0 Injustice Scalia's view, the Court already
had a bright line rule. He was unhappy with Justice O'Connor for
muddying the water:
[O]ur previously stated rule [is] that a public employer's disciplin-
ing of an employee violates the Speech and Press Clause of the First
Amendment only if it is in retaliation for the employee's speech on
a matter of public concern. Justice O'Connor would add to this
prohibition a requirement that the employer conduct an investiga-
tion before taking disciplinary action in certain circumstances. This
recognition of a broad new First Amendment procedural right is in
my view unprecedented, superfluous to the decision in the present
case, unnecessary for protection of public-employee speech on
matters of public concern and unpredictable in its application and
consequences. 1
Although the question of how to apply Connick was not answered
dispositively, federal managers would be well-advised to heed Justice
O'Connor's approach until the Court provides some clearer guidance.
504. Id. (explaining that Court still has responsibility to perform First Amendment analysis




508. Id. at 1886.
509. Id. at 1897 (ScaliaJ., concurring injudgment) (describingJustice O'Connor's approach
as posing more questions than answers).
510. Id. at 1895 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that pretext inquiry will
provide suitable protection for "public interest speech" without creating new First Amendment
rights).
511. Id. at 1893 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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From Justice O'Connor's perspective, Waters is simply a small cautious
step by the Court toward expanding federal employee due process
rights further that will not "unduly burden" employer decision-
making. 12 From Justice Scalia's view, it is a quantum leap, expand-
ing First Amendment procedure "into brand new areas."51 From
both opinions, it is clear that Waters expands federal employee due
process rights while "attempting to reserve for public managers the
ultimate ability to determine whether public employee speech detracts
from the Government's ability to perform its mission.
IV. IMPACT OF WATERS AND NTEU ON FEDERAL CIRCuIT AND MERIT
SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD PRACTICE
Neither Waters nor NTEUappear to have an impact on the MSPB's
or the Federal Circuit's prior decisions.514 Of the two, Waters will
have more direct impact on Federal Circuit and MSPBjurisprudence
512. Id. at 1889 (stating that objective analysis of facts will prevent trampling on First
Amendment rights without burdening employer).
513. Id. at 1894 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that procedural requirements
endorsed by majority exceed due process protections offered to public employees).
514. A review of MSPB and Federal Circuit case law conducted after Waters and NTEUwere
decided found that federal employee First Amendment issues have been raised before in both
forums, resulting in at least 33 separate opinions. The review found that on at least 26
occasions, the MSPB or the Federal Circuit had engaged in substantive discussion of issues
involving First Amendment rights. It is worth noting the context within which these issues are
raised. The cases arise when management, upset at some form of workplace conduct by a
particular employee, moves to discipline the employee and the employee raises the First
Amendment as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Mings v. Department ofJustice, 813 F.2d 384
(Fed. Cir. 1987); Stanek v. Department of Transp., 805 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Means v.
Department of Labor, 60 M.S.P.R. 108 (1993); Social Sec. Admin. v. Whittlesey, 59 M.S.P.IL 684
(1993), aftld, 39 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Higgins v. United States Postal Serv., 43 M.S.P.R.
66 (1989); Henry v. Department of Navy, 40 M.S.P.R. 482 (1989), afI'd, 902 F.2d 949 (Fed. Cir.
1990);Jackson v. Small Business Admin., 40 M.S.P.R. 137 (1989); Sigman v. Department of Air
Force, 37 M.S.P.R. 352 (1988); Wenzel v. Department of Interior, 33 M.S.P.R. 344 (1987); Lewis
v. Bureau of Engraving & Printing, 29 M.S.P.R. 447 (1985); Ledeaux v. Veterans Admin., 29
M.S.P.R. 440 (1985); Osokow v. Office of Personnel Management, 25 M.S.P.R. 319 (1984);
Kehrier v. Department of Justice, 27 M.S.P.R. 477 (1985); Barnes v. Department of Army, 22
M.S.P.R. 243 (1984), afd 840 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Special Counsel v. Biggs, 16 M.S.P.R.
355 (1983); Brown v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 15 M.S.P.R. 224 (1983), remanded, 735 F.2d
543 (Fed. Cir. 1984), decLsidon on remand 21 M.S.P.R. 572 (1984); Farris v. United States Postal
Serv., 14 M.S.P.R. 568 (1983); Curry v. Department of Navy, 13 M.S.P.R. 327 (1982);Johnson
v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 13 M.S.P.R. 187 (1982), affid on other grounds, 735 F.2d 510
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Prescott v. National Inst. of Child Health & Dev., 6 M.S.P.R. 252 (1981);
Bradley v. Defense Communications Agency, 3 M.S.P.R. 498 (1980); Quarry v. General
Accounting Office, 3 M.S.P.R. 200 (1980).
A number of other cases have raised First Amendment defenses, but the MSPB or the Federal
Circuit did not reach those issues because the cases were decided on other grounds, either
procedural or substantive. See Manning v. MSPB, 742 F.2d 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Ferdon v.
United States Postal Serv., 60 M.S.P.R. 325 (1994); Massimino v. Veterans Affairs, 58 M.S.P.R.
318 (1993); Umshler v. Department of Interior, 55 M.S.P.R. 593 (1992), aftd, 6 F.3d 788 (Fed
Cir. 1993);Jones v. United States Postal Serv., 27 M.S.P.R. 193 (1985); Karapinka v. Department
of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R. 124 (1981).
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because it involves disciplinary action against a public employee, while
NTEUinvolves the underlying constitutionality of a statute. Although
the Federal Circuit's and the MSPB's case law adhere to Pickering and
Connick, it is useful nonetheless to examine the context in which cases
involving similar scenarios arise within both jurisdictions.
A. Early Decisions by the MSPB
The earliest MSPB case involving a First Amendment question was
decided shortly after the MSPB was created in 1980. In Bradly v.
Defense Communications Agency,515 an employee was removed from his
position in 1977 after sending a memorandum to his immediate
supervisor and copies of the memorandum to three other supervisors
in his chain of command that criticized reliability studies of a defense
computer network.516 The case was the subject of a decision by the
MSPB's predecessor, the Federal Employees Appeals Authority in
1978.517 Timeliness was an issue. The employee submitted what he
claimed was new and material evidence not originally available to him,
but he failed to explain why he waited more than five months after
the information came to his attention.58 The MSPB denied the
employee's petition to reopen, but found that because his statements
appeared to be constitutionally protected, it reopened the case on its
own motion and remanded it to an administrative law judge for
further proceedings.5 9 The Bradley decision did not refer to the
Pickering520 balancing test.
The first MSPB case to refer to the Pickeringbalancing test occurred
one year later in Prescott v. National Institute of Child Health and
Development.5 21 Prescott involved a senior scientist's dispute with his
agency director over the scientist's views of the agency's mission.522
After research proposals that Prescott had prepared were rejected
because his supervisor thought they went beyond the scope of the
agency's mission; and when he was denied permission to speak at
515. 3 M.S.P.R. 498 (1980).
516. Bradley v. Defense Communications Agency, 3 M.S.P.R. 498, 499-500 (1980).
517. Id. (citingAug. 9,1978 decision of Federal Employees Appeals Authority). The decision
advised the employee (under the regulations then in effect) that he could seek reopening and
reconsecration within a reasonable time after receipt of the decision. On November 29, 1979,
he did so. By the time his request was acted on the MSPB had come into existence and took
over the case.
518. Id at 500.
519. Id. at 500-01 (finding that field office limited employee's ability to develop case).
520. For a discussion of the PckJeding balancing test, see supra notes 432-506 and
accompanying text (striking balance between employee interest in public commentary and
employer interest in workplace efficiency).
521. 6 M.S.P.R. 252 (1981).
522. Prescott v. National Inst. of Child Health & Dev., 6 M.S.P.R. 252, 254-55 (1981).
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certain professional conferences, he filed an administrative grievance
against the director.123 While the grievance was pending, Prescott
wrote several letters criticizing the director's view of the agency's
mission to colleagues in the scientific community outside of his
agency. 24 He used government time, employees, materials, and
franked postage-paid envelopes to send the letters." Also, he
signed them in his official capacity.52 6
The letters generated great response and "outrage" from recipients,
and it took considerable effort for the agency to rectify matters.527
Prescott was subsequently removed for misusing his official position
and for using government resources for personal matters.52  He
asserted that his firing for sending these letters violated his First
Amendment right to free speech.52
The MSPB agreed with the Presiding Official's5" reliance on the
balancing test set forth in Pickering and Mount Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle" to determine whether the
interests of Prescott, as a citizen, in commenting on matters of public
concern, were outweighed by the interest of the Government, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service." 2 The
Presiding Official had decided that the Government's interest in
promoting efficiency outweighed Prescott's First Amendment
rights. 3' On appeal, the MSPB determined that Prescott's efforts
were meant to further his own private interests in an internal dispute
within the agency by taking his fight outside the agency.51m The
MSPB thus held that Prescott's actions were not protected by the First
Amendment." In arriving at this result, the MSPB presaged the




527. d. at 256.
528. Id. at 256-57.
529. I&
530. Under MSPB regulations, the Presiding Official is now called the AdministrativeJudge.
15 C.FR. § 1201.4(a) (1995). When the MSPB first established its administrative hearing
procedures, the hearing official who heard the employee's appeal was called a "Presiding
Official." See 54 Fed. Reg. 53,501, 53,501-02 (Dec. 29, 1989). This was subsequently changed
from "Presiding Official" to "Administrative Judge" to more accurately describe the hearing
official's adjudicatory function. Id. If an Administrative Judge's decision is adverse to the
employee, the employee can appeal the decision to the three-member MSPB. 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.114-.118 (1995).
531. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
532. Prescott, 6 M.S.P.R. at 255.
533. Id. (finding that employee wrote letter to bolster his own position, and not as matter
of public concern).
534. M.
535. 1&f at 256.
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Court's approach in Connick concerning whether workplace related
speech involved a matter of public concern or was based on the
purely private motives of the employee.
5 36
B. First Amendment Review in the Air Traffic Controllers Strike by the
MSPB and Federal Circuit
One of the Federal Circuit's most significant First Amendment
decisions arose out of the 1981 air traffic controller strike. The
Federal Circuit and the MSPB had the opportunity to review the air
traffic controller case in light of both Pickering and Connick.
The MSPB's first decision, Brown v. Department of Transportation,537
came less than a month after the Court decided Connick.,53 Interest-
ingly, the case involved a management air traffic control official who
did not participate in the strike, but who was removed from his
position for his comments concerning the work stoppage.8 9 Harold
Brown had been an agency employee for almost twenty-five years
when he was removed in September 1981.11 Brown worked at the
New York Air Traffic Control Center, supervising approximately nine
air traffic controllers. 41 On the evening of August 4, 1981, while
off-duty, he went to the local PATCO union hall in Mineola, New
York.542 He claimed that his purpose was to inform those air traffic
controllers who he supervised that he was still working.5'4 He stated
that he then somehow found himself at a podium in the union hall
and told a listening crowd, inter alia, "I'm so happy you're together.
Stay together, please, because if you do, you'll win.""4 News media
representatives were present and his "stay together" remarks were
recorded and subsequently broadcasted nationwide on the ABC
television news program "Nightline."' Unfortunately for Brown,
his supervisor saw the television program that evening and within
twenty-four hours Brown received a letter proposing his removal from
536. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,143 (1983) (determiningwhether speech was matter
of public concern).
537. 15 M.S.P.R. 224 (1983), aJl'd in part, rev'd in part, 735 F.2d 543 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
538. Connick v; Myerswas decided April 20, 1983. 461 U.S. at 138. The MSPB's first decision
in Broumwas issued May 19, 1983. Brown v. Department ofTransp. (FAA), 15 M.S.P.R. 224,225
(1983), afld in part, rev'd in par4 735 F.2d 543 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
539. Brown, 15 M.S.P.R. at 225.




544. i. at 545.
545. Id.
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the federal service for statements contradicting President Reagan's
public orders directing striking controllers to return to work.5
46
Brown was subsequently removed for misconduct and he ap-
pealed . 47 The Presiding Official found that the agency had estab-
lished, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Brown's remarks
amounted to approval of and support for the strike." The Presid-
ing Official, however, further found that Brown's remarks constituted
free speech under the First Amendment.5 4  Accordingly, the
Presiding Official held that the agency could demonstrate "'no
legitimate interest in efficiency that outweigh[ed] appellant's interest
in free speech.'" 50  The Presiding Official reversed the agency's
removal, and the agency petitioned the MSPB for review.
5 51
The MSPB recognized that the balancing test of Pickeringshould be
used to determine whether a public employee's speech was or was not
protected. 52  The MSPB also recognized that in the recent
Connick5 3 decision, the Supreme Court had decided that in public
employee disciplinary actions, First Amendment protection for public
employee speech extended only to speech on matters of public
concern."M The MSPB noted that the Court in Connick had found
that the Government's burden for justifying a particular personnel
action varied with the degree of public concern involved in the
subject matter of the speech.55 At the time of Brown's remarks, the
country was in real danger of a virtual shutdown of all air travel and
shipping.5 6 The MSPB noted first, that only 2308 of 9034 control-
lers who were scheduled to report for work the day the strike was
called did so, and second, that within the first five days of the strike,
the FAA was forced to cancel approximately 26,000 flights and operate
at sixty-nine percent capacity.55 Viewing Brown's remarks in this




549. Brown v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 15 M.S.P.R. 224, 225 (1983) (citing decision
of regional board).
550. I& at 226 (quoting Presiding Officer).
551. I&
552. l ("The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees." (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1988))).
553. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
554. Brown, 15 M.S.P.R. at 229 (explaining that federal court was appropriate forum for
matters of public concern, not for personnel matters).
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public concern because of the audience (local air traffic controllers),
and content of the remarks (no information or viewpoint regarding
the strike that could be construed as of significant interest to the
general public in terms of air safety or issues involved in the
strike)." Given these factors, the MSPB held that Brown's speech
was entitled only to limited First Amendment protection 5 9 so that
the'agency's decision to fire him for remarks made to the striking air
traffic controllers did not infringe on his First Amendment rights.5
60
The MSPB thus reversed the decision of the Presiding Official and
sustained the agency's decision to remove Brown.561
Brown appealed the MSPB's decision to the Federal Circuit.5 62
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the MSPB that the remarks were
not matters of public concern, but found that the Pickering balance
tilted in favor of the agency." The court, however, examining the
appropriateness of the penalty, found that removal was too harsh
given the circumstances.5" The Federal Circuit looked to the
"'content, form and context'" of Brown's remarks "'as revealed by the
whole record." ' t While Brown's remarks were indeed made at a
union hall with union members present, journalists were also
present.566 Further, his comments were made in a highly charged
atmosphere.567 Also, he made other comments to reporters after he
left the podium that the strike was illegal but that he nonetheless
supported some of the demands made by the strikers.s Weighing
all this, the Federal Circuit concluded that Brown's comments rose "to
the level of speech on a matter of urgent public concern."569
Applying what it characterized as the "delicate balancing pro-
cess"5 70 of Pickering, the Federal Circuit nonetheless weighed the
balance in favor of the agency.5 7' The Federal Circuit found that
the strike was nationwide, that the strike was both illegal and criminal
558. Id. at 233.
559. 1d.
560. Id. (finding that FAA did not have to tolerate employee's disruptive activity given extent
of labor crisis).
561. Id.
562. Id. at 236.
563. Brown v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 735 F.2d 543, 548 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding
that severity of national crisis outweighed employee's interest in public commentary).
564. Id. at 548-49.






571, Id. at 547-48.
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under federal law, and that a vital artery of the nation's transportation
system was adversely affected.572 The Federal Circuit was also struck
by the timing of Brown's remarks, which occurred less than thirty-six
hours after the strike had been called and within the forty-eight hour
grace period authorized by President Reagan for the strikers to return
to work."73 It also weighed in Brown's status as a supervisor and his
numerous years of experience, which made him one to whom the
strikers might look for guidance.574 The court further found that
cooperation, loyalty, and trust were critical among those tasked with
managing the operation of a complex, sophisticated transportation
system in which hundreds of lives were at stake at any given moment
and split second judgments were often required.575 Accordingly, the
court found that "the interest of the agency did, in this national
emergency, outweigh Brown's interest in free speech, such that his
remarks are not constitutionally protected."5 76
The Federal Circuit nonetheless found that the agency had
overreacted in imposing an unreasonable penalty, given Brown's long
years of service, his dedication, and his exhortation to the strikers to
"all come back."577 On remand to the MSPB, the removal order was
canceled, and Brown was ordered demoted to a nonsupervisory
position with the least possible reduction in grade.5 78
C. First Amendment Review by the MSPB and Federal Circuit
in Other Cases
1. MSPB cases
The Waters decision held that a public employer was required to
conduct an initial investigation into whether comments made by an
employee were protected by the First Amendment before taking
disciplinary action.579 Although the MSPB did not hear a case
specifically involving the adequacy of an employer's investigation as




576. Id. at 548.
577. Id.
578. Brown v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 21 M.S.P.R. 572, 573 (1984).
579. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1882 (1994) (holding that employer must
objectively analyze content of speech). Justice O'Connor characterized this as "two opportuni-
ties to be vindicated." Id. at 1885. Justice Scalia, in his separate concurring opinion was less
charitable to Justice O'Connor's view. He characterized it as a needless requirement to
"investigate... to determine whether.., to investigate." Id. at 1897 (ScaliaJ., concurring in
judgment).
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to whether a public employee's statements were protected by the First
Amendment, Barnes v. Department of Army dealt with a similar type of
investigation for disciplinary action." -The agency removed a
computer programmer for making false and malicious statements
"with the intent to harm the reputations, authority and official
standing of agency employees.""' The employee wrote six letters
alleging that various agency personnel had perjured themselves in
testimony at a hearing.8 2  In upholding the agency's removal
notwithstanding the employee's claims of First Amendment protec-
tion, the MSPB noted:
It also adversely affected the efficiency of the agency as it became
necessary to conduct an extensive investigation to determine the
veracity of appellant's allegations, when he had every reason to
know the falsity of the charges and every opportunity to determine
the accuracy of the allegations. Consequently, we find that these
statements are not entitled to the protection of the First Amend-
ment.
583
Other MSPB decisions have exposed the tension between statutory
protections against discrimination in the workplace and claims that
alleged discriminatory remarks are entitled to First Amendment
protection so as to shield the speaker from possible discipline. This
tension can be seen in Curry v. Department of Navy,5" where a female
apprentice reported to her supervisor a conversation in which a
machinist foreman denigrated the place of women in the machine
shop as well as in the apprentice program.5" When discipline was
proposed, the foreman asserted that his comments were protected by
the First Amendment.5 6  Citing Pickering, the MSPB held that an
agency, as a public employer, may properly regulate speech that is
directly related to the "employment milieu as opposed to the public
forum" in sustaining the agency's disciplinary action. 8 7 In Higgins
580. 22 M.S.P.R. 243 (1984), aff0d, 840 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
581. Barnes v. Small, 22 M.S.P.R. 243, 244 (1984), aft'd, 840 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
582. Id. at 245.
583. Id at 247.
584. 13 M.S.P.R. 327 (1982) (holding that employee's sexist remarks were not protected by
First Amendment).
585. Curry v. Department of Navy, 13 M.S.P.R. 327, 328 (1982) (holding that employee's
demotion resulting from sexist remark to co-worker did not violate right to free speech under
First Amendment). The court in Holland v. Department of Air Force, 31 F.3d 1118 (Fed. Cir.
1994), in which the court, finding it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment issue, reversed
the agency's decision to demote a warehouse foreman for making derogatory remarks to women
in the workplace. Md2 at 1121. The court held that the charges were insufficiently vague as a
matter of law to support the discipline imposed. Id.
586. Cury, 13 M.S.P.R. at 328.
587. Id. at 332.
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v. United States Postal Service," an employee was removed for making
obscene remarks during a lecture and for distributing a handout that
repeated many of the same remarks. 89 The MSPB held that the
employee enjoyed no First Amendment protection.5 90
In other decisions the MSPB has shown a strong propensity to
uphold management action against claims by employees of First
Amendment protections. In Lewis v. Bureau of Engraving & Print-
ing,591 an employee wrote a letter regarding racial problems to
which he allegedly had been subjected.592 As a result of the letter,
the employee was disciplined for being absent without leave (AWOL)
and insubordination.59 The employee contended that the informa-
tion he provided in the letter concerning racial problems was
protected by the First Amendment.5  The MSPB disagreed and
held that the First Amendment public concern was only tangential
and that the employee's activities were disruptive to the
workplace.595 In Osokow v. Office of Personnel Management,"95 the
MSPB upheld the removal of an employee for a pattern of disrespect-
ful conduct toward his supervisors stemming from the distribution of
leaflets outside the Office of Personnel Management's Los Angeles
and San Francisco offices." The leaflets asked employees if they
were tired of being subjected to "unscrupulous supervisions," and
advised them that if so, they should plan to organize a "federal
employees complaint day."5" Similarly, in LeDeaux v. Veterans'
Administration,5  the MSPB held that allegations contained in
criminal charges filed in state court by an employee against his
supervisor were not protected by the First Amendment because the
statements had an adverse impact on the agency's mission.0 In
Sigman v. Department of Air Force,"0' the MSPB did not overturn the
agency's removal of an employee who circulated a four-page memo-
588. 43 M.S.P.R. 66 (1989).
589. Higgins v. United States Postal Serv., 43 M.S.P.R. 66, 67 (1987).
590. I& at 68-69.
591. 29 M.S.P.R. 447 (1985).
592. Lewis v. Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 29 M.S.P.R. 447, 451 (1985).
593. Ifr at 452.
594. Ii at 451 (arguing that complaint to employer about racial discrimination was protected
speech).
595. I&
596. 25 M.S.P.R. 319 (1984).
597. Osokow v. Office of Personnel Management, 25 M.S.P.R. 319, 321 (1984).
598. 1I at 321-22.
599. 29 M.S.P.R. 440 (1985).
600. LeDeaux v. Veterans' Admin., 29 M.S.P.R. 440, 445 (1985) (finding that employee's
comments disrupted employer-employee relationship).
601. 37 M.S.P.R. 352 (1988).
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randum to various offices on the air base where she worked,
containing allegedly disrespectful and intimidating comments about
her supervisors. °2 The MSPB found that the information con-
cerned personal and other internal matters and, as such, was not
protected by the First Amendment. 3
The MSPB, applying the Pickering balancing test in Jackson v. Small
Business Administration, °4 sustained a charge of insubordination
against an employee who mailed a memorandum, prepared for his
supervisor, to a member of the public, who was the subject of the
memorandum. 5 The memorandum alleged discrimination against
minority contractors by the Small Business Administration. 60 6 The
MSPB found that the Administrative Judge erred in finding that the
contents of the memorandum did not involve a matter of public
concern.6 °7 The MSPB found, however, that this was harmless error
because although the letter did address a matter of public concern,
it adversely affected the public's confidence in the integrity of the
government.6 °" The MSPB found that the agency's interest in
promoting the efficiency of the service outweighed appellant's right
to free speech.'
There has been one case in which the MSPB found that an
employee's speech was protected by the First Amendment. In Farris
v. United States Postal Service,61° the employee, while off-duty, pre-
pared and distributed a flyer that was critical of agency manage-
ment.6 ' The employee distributed the flyer at an employee en-
trance to the worksite.612 The flyer was also prepared and distribut-
ed in connection with the employee's union activities, but the
Presiding Official who heard the employee's initial appeal determined
that itwas unnecessary to reach this issue because the flyer constituted
protected speech under the First Amendment.613 The Presiding
602. Sigman v. Department of Air Force, 37 M.S.P.R. 352, 354-56 (1988).
603. X. at 355 (explaining that employee's memorandum concerned intra-office issues and
was not matter of public concern).
604. 40 M.S.P.R. 137 (1989).
605. Jackson v. Small Business Admin., 40 M.S.P.R. 137, 142 (1989).
606. I. at 143.
607. Id. at 145 (finding that issue addressed by memorandum, namely racial discrimination,
was matter of public concern).
608. d2 at 146.
609. l (stating that letter to one contractor could diminish public's confidence in agency
and thus adversely affect operation of agency).
610. 14 M.S.P.R. 568 (1983).
611. Farris v. United States Postal Serv., 14 M.S.P.R. 568, 570 (1983).
612. x at 571.
613. Id.
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Official applied an extensive Pickering analysis.1 4 He found that
there was no evidence that the information in the flyer was written in
reckless disregard of the truth and that the real focus should be on
whether the flyer was disruptive of the employment relationship.615
The Presiding Official had no difficulty in finding that due to the
appellant's past distribution of numerous writings and that the flyer
in question was met by other employees with "complete apathy," that
there was no disruption of the employment relationship.616 Accord-
ingly, the employee was found to have engaged in protected speech
and could not be disciplined by management. 17
2. Federal Circuit cases
In addition to Brown v. Department of Transportation18 several other
Federal Circuit decisions deal with First Amendment issues. In Stanek
v. Department of Transportation,6 19 the Federal Circuit upheld the
removal of an employee for unauthorized use of government
property, improper loan solicitation, and promotion of a research
system that interfered with the agency's own program. 6 ' The
employee's activity included testifying before a congressional
committee, authoring numerous newspaper articles critical of the
agency, and preparing and distributing a position paper critical of an
agency study.621 In his position paper, which was distributed to
highway departments in all fifty states, the employee asked state
officials to send information to him so that he could send it directly
to the appropriate congressional committee.61
In Stanek, the employee argued that once it had been established
that the speech at issue was on a matter of public concern, the
burden shifted to the Government to "clearly demonstrate" that the
speech "substantially interfered" with agency operations. 2- The
Federal Circuit categorically rejected this interpretation, stating that
Connick624 stood for the proposition that the Government's burden
in justifying a particular disciplinary action in a First Amendment
614. Id.
615. Id. at 572.
616. Id.
617. I. at 571-73.
618. 15 M.S.P.R. 24 (1983), a/'d in part, rev'd in par, 735 F.2d 543 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also
supra note 537 and accompanying text (discussing Brown as MSPB's first decision).
619. 805 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
620. Stanek v. Department of Transp. (FAA), 805 F.2d 1572, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
621. Id. at 1575.
622. d. at 1574.
623. I(. at 1578.
624. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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context varies depending on the nature of the employee's expres-
sion.62 The Federal Circuit noted that the nature of the
employee's speech was of far greater public concern than the type of
internal office dispute involved in Connick. 21 The Federal Circuit
stated that the appropriate burden in such a circumstance was on the
agency to demonstrate that the matter of public concern interfered
with the agency's program in a material way. 27
Commenting that common sense suggests that an agency cannot
function correctly where an employee establishes an unauthorized
quasi-official office that directly competes in function with an existing
government program, the Federal Circuit held that the agency had
met this burden. 28 The Federal Circuit concluded that the agency's
interest in maintaining a coherent system of coordinating highway
research outweighed the employee's interest in public comment.
629
Two Federal Circuit decisions involve First Amendment claims on
matters with a more particularized concern to the employee. In
Mings v. Department of Justice,'s the letter at issue never left the
agency, but its author asserted First Amendment rights nonethe-
less.63' In Mings, a Border Patrol agent was removed for writing and
sending, on agency letterhead, a letter to the agency's Assistant
Director for Investigations, disparaging Catholics, Hispanics and other
Border Patrol agents. 3 2 The Federal Circuit sustained the removal,
finding that the letter related only peripherally to a matter of public
concern and was likely to have a highly disruptive impact on the
agency's operations.' The Federal Circuit addressed the prospect of
disciplining an employee for engaging in protected speech on a
matter of public concern:
Even assuming arguendo that the petitioner's letter did address a
matter of public concern, the agency would be precluded from
relying upon the letter as a basis for removal only if the petitioner's
625. Stanek, 805 F.2d at 1578-79 (holding that state's burden is not fixed, but rather varies
according to nature and degree of speech at issue).
626. Id. at 1579 (finding public matter in Connick, namely judgment of employee's
supervisor, was of less public concern than public matter in case at bar).




630. 813 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
631. Mings v. Department ofJustice, 813 F.2d 384, 387 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
632. Id. at 386.
633. Id. at 389 (concluding that employee's letter disparaging Hispanics and Catholics would
directly impact at least half of border patrol employees and thus disrupt mission of agency).
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free speech interest outweighed the interest of the agency in
promoting the efficiency of the public service it performs.6M
In doing so, the Federal Circuit quoted Connick for the proposition
that the First Amendment "'does not require a public office be run
as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office af-
fairs. 1"635
In Henry v. Department of Navy,6 6 the letter at issue was circulated
outside the agency. The employee, a payroll technician, wrote to four
guest speakers who were scheduled to appear at an upcoming Martin
Luther King Day event, criticizing the local commander of the Marine
Corps Finance Center in Kansas City because gospel singing was not
included in the celebration. 7 The Federal Circuit acknowledged
that whether or not gospel singing was included on an officially-
sponsored program for the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King could
well be a matter of public concern.6' Conceding that public
interest was part of the analysis, the Federal Circuit examined all the
other facts and circumstances and determined that there was a
justifiable basis for the agency taking the action it did.639 The
Federal Circuit upheld the firing of the employee"0 because the
employee categorically refused to do assigned work and made patently
false and unfounded accusations."' The false accusations, the court
noted, were against the commander, the local union, and others. 6
Finally, in David v. United States,' the Ninth Circuit made it clear
that an employee could not skirt the MSPB'sjurisdiction by asserting
a First Amendment claim in federal court, but was required by the
Civil Service Reform Act to exercise MSPB appeal rights.' In
David, a longtime employee of a defense agency, who was also a union
official, brought an action against the Government after she was
terminated for being absent without leave.' She alleged statutory
and constitutional violations and sought back pay and damages for
intentional infliction of mental harm.' The district court granted
summary judgment against her on all her claims except one, which it
634. Id. at 388.
635. Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983)).
636. 902 F.2d 949 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
637. Henry v. Department of Navy, 902 F.2d 949, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
638. I. at 952.
639. Id. at 951-54.
640. Id. at 954.
641. Id. at 953.
642. Id.
643. 820 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir. 1987).
644. David v. United States, 820 F.2d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 1987).
645. I. at 1039.
646. I.
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dismissed without prejudice.' She appealed the district court
rulings on all but the back pay issue.' The court of appeals
upheld the district court.' 9 Additionally, there is one reported case
where two federal employees were disciplined for engaging in reprisal
against an employee who exercised his First Amendment rights.60
CONCLUSION
Federal employees occupy a special status in the law. They are
unlike their private sector counterparts in that their employment
relationship is not governed by principles of contract law. Instead,
they are "appointed" to a position in the federal civil service, which
carries with it a corresponding change in their "status."
This change in "status" means that they are subject to more
substantial intrusions by the Government, acting as their employer,
than would be possible had they remained private citizens.
Whether in conscious or unconscious recognition of this fact,
Congress, over the past twenty-five years, has created a substantial
body of due process protections for federal employees in a variety of
legislation. There is thus a trade-off. While citizens, who become
employees of the Federal Government must accept restrictions on
their constitutional rights in return for ajob, they are the beneficia-
ries of a considerable body of workplace due process protections that
their private citizen counterparts do not enjoy.
Correspondingly, the Supreme Court, when it has been asked to
look at what the Government can do to regulate wholesale the
conduct of its employees ex ante, has recognized the Government's
authority to restrict the conduct of its employees. The Court,
however, has created a balancing test that weighs the constitutional
interest of employees in engaging in certain conduct against the
Government's interest in regulating or restricting the conduct. The
Court has also been asked to look at circumstances where the
Government acts ex post to discipline employees for engaging in
certain types of conduct, where the employees subsequently raise a
constitutionally protected right, such as freedom of speech, as a
defense to the Government's action. In the former situation, the
Court has made it more difficult for the Government to outweigh the
interests of the employees, for understandable reasons-the govern-
647. Id
648. Id.
649. Id at 1044.
650. See Special Counsel v. Lynn & Chiarella, 29 M.S.P.IL 666 (1986) (discussing only
reported incident of employee retaliation).
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ment action bars an entire category of speech or conduct and
operates against an entire class of employees or a large number at
least. In the latter situation, the Court tends to apportion the balance
according to the facts and circumstances. For example, the Court
recognizes that these cases typically involve only one individual.
Where the speech or conduct involves complaints by an employee
about his or her own job, the Court seems to tilt toward protecting
the Government's interest; where the speech or conduct does not
involve the employee's own job, but involves broader matters of
government policy, the Court appears more likely to hold the
Government to a tougher standard.
The nature of the MSPB's jurisdiction (and resultingly, that of the
Federal Circuit) requires it to focus on cases involving ex post
discipline of federal employees where the employees are raising
constitutional matters as an affirmative defense to the Government's
disciplinary action. Given the limited nature of the MSPB's and the
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, a review of the case law establishes that
both have been consistent with the approach taken by Court, and the
NTEU and Waters decisions will not require a change in case law.
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